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INTRODUCTION
The initial study in this series surveyed broadly the field of public
utilities with the objective of determining in what degree regulated
industries must comply with the antitrust laws. Amazingly divergent
decisions were discovered. A second study dealt with a specific in-
dustry-broadcasting-which is subject to only slight interventionist
controls. The conclusion was reached that the antitrust laws do and
should apply to that trade. A third project involved motor carriers-
Detailed investigation of that form of transport revealed-somewhat
surprisingly-that regulation was not sufficiently comprehensive wholly
to exclude the application of the antitrust laws to that industry.
SPrior installments in this series appeared in 106 U. PA. L. REv. 641 (1958)
(public utilities generally) ; in 107 U. PA. L. REv. 585 (1959) (radio and television
broadcasting) ; and in 108 U. PA. L. Rmv. 775 (1960) (motor carriers). The authors
gratefully acknowledge the assistance, in gathering materials for the present study,
of Bruce L. Bromberg, LL.B. 1960, University of Chicago. They also had the
benefit of examining a chapter on aviation from Professor Carl H. Fulda's forth-
coming book, Competition in the Regulated Industries. The findings with respect
to regulation expressed herein are substantially in accord with those of Professor
Fulda; there may be, however, a considerable difference in the conclusions drawn
therefrom. A prospectus of this study was presented to Professor George J. Stigler's
Industrial Organization Workshop at the University of Chicago on February 23, 1960.
The helpful suggestions of the seminar members on that occasion are gratefully
acknowledged. The courtesy of Messrs. Mayer, Friedlich, Spiess, Tierney, Brown,
and Platt in permitting the use of library facilities is also acknowledged.
t A.B. 1935, Yale University; LL.B. 1938, Harvard University; J.S.D. 1940,
University of Chicago. Member, Illinois Bar.
t A.B. 1940, Mount Holyoke College; M.A. 1946, American University. Lec-
turer in Economics, Lake Forest College.
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We now turn to the field of aviation.' Comprehensive regulation
of air carriers in the United States dates back only to 1938. The Civil
Aeronautics Act of that year provided detailed economic and safety
controls,2 and vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board power to limit
entry into the air transport business, to control the subsidies paid to
airlines, and to regulate comprehensively rates and services. No sub-
stantial change in the economic controls was made by the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, which was designed to make more effective
the regulation of air safety.'
Both statutes contain general policy directives indicating to the
Civil Aeronautics Board the factors it should consider in exercising
its powers. Among the matters to be considered by the CAB as being
"in the public interest" are: the encouragement and development of
an air transport system; the regulation of that system in a manner
that recognizes its inherent advantages and that fosters sound economic
conditions; ' the promotion of adequate, efficient service at reasonable
rates without unjust discriminations or unfair or destructive competitive
practices; 5 competition to the extent necessary for the sound develop-
ment of the industry; safety; and the promotion of aeronautics in
general. 6
I This study is based upon an examination of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-542 (1958), and decisions thereunder; regulations
of the Civil Aeronautics Board incorporated in the Code of Federal Regulations;
a page by page search of the decisions in volumes 17-21 of the CAB Reports; a
page by page examination of the CCH Aviation Law Reporter from May 20, 1959,
to May 20, 1960; the annual reports of the CAB since 1938; and appropriate secondary
literature and most of the cases cited therein.
2 See Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1235, 1237-39,
1252-57 (1947).
3 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-542 (1958).
See generally ANTITRUST SuBcoMMiTTE OF THE HousE CommiTTEE ON THE JuDiciAy,
85TH CoNG., 1ST SESs., REPoRT oN AmILINES 48-53 (1957) [hereinafter cited as
AIRLINES REPORT]; Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in United States
Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis (pts. 1-2), 24 J. AIR
L. & Com. 410 (1957), 25 J. AIR L. & Com. 148 (1958).
4 The exact congressional language is: "The regulation of air transportation in
such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, assure the
highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic conditions in, such trans-
portation, and to improve the relations between, and coordinate transportation by,
air carriers . . . ." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(b), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1302(b) (1958).
5The exact congressional language is: "The promotion of adequate, economical,
and efficient service by air carriers at reasonable charges, without unjust discrimina-
tions, undue preferences or advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive prac-
tices . . . ." Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102(c), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1302(c) (1958).
6 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1958);
Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 2, 52 Stat. 980. The powers of the CAB
over air carriers, while comprehensive, are not unlimited. Thus the CAB has no
power to impose on the carrier a scheme for appointing an additional director to
break deadlocks on the board. Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670, 678
(1944). Note also that the regulatory scheme for aviation is only loosely correlated
with regulation over railroads, motor carriers, and other forms of transport. See
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An important question is to what extent Congress intended that
the industry be competitive. Some observers have taken the position
that regulation was to be minimized and competition emphasized.' In
this connection should be noted the exact language of the congressional
desideratum: "competition to the extent necessary to assure the sound
development of an air-transportation system properly adapted to the
needs of the foreign and domestic commerce of the United States, of
the Postal Service, and of the national defense . . . . " This state-
ment of policy obviously leaves many questions unanswered.
Within the body of the statute appear several express exemptions
from the antitrust laws. Thus agreements among air carriers must
be submitted to the CAB and, if approved by that tribunal, cannot be
questioned under the Sherman Act.9 The implication is clear that
activities not so exempted may be questioned under the antitrust laws.10
Porter, Federal Regulation of Private Carriers, 64 HARv. L. REv. 896, 910-11 (1951).
The CAB has only limited authority over international operations. It may issue
permits to foreign air carriers to allow them to enter into the United States. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 402, 72 Stat. 757, 49 U.S.C. § 1372 (1958). Both the issuance
of such permits and the issuance of certificates to domestic air carriers to engage
in foreign traffic are subject to presidential approval. Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§ 801, 72 Stat 782, 49 U.S.C. § 1461 (1958). International treaties and conventions
play a large role in the exercise of both the foregoing powers. MANCE, INTERNA-
TIONAL AIm TRANSPORTATION 25, 38, 42 (1944); AIRLINES REPORT 33-36. Various
foreign states have created monopolistic air transport services, sometimes reserving
a monopoly of air travel to the state to such local carriers and others authorized
by international agreement. E.g., Civil Aviation Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 70,
§§1, 23.
State regulation has not been important. See generally S.S.W., Inc. v. Air
Transp. Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952) ;
BIGHAM & RoERTS, TRANSPORTATIOw 272, 274 (1952); AIRLINES REPORT 50;
Keyes, National Policy Toward Commercial Aviation--Some Basic Problems, 16
J. AIR L. & Com. 280, 288 (1949) ; Comment, Air Law-The Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, 57 MIcH. L. REv. 1214-15, 1219 (1959). Air carriers may be includable with
other forms of transport in general public utility controls. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
111%, § 10.3 (Supp. 1959). Legislation does exist with respect to the construction
of airports and the like. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 15Y2, §§22.1-.83 (1957), as
amended, ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 15Y2, §§ 22.1-.83 (Supp. 1959). See WILcox, PUBLIC
PoLIcIES TowARns BUSINESS 639 (1955). A survey of state efforts to impose eco-
nomic regulation on air carriers will be found in Rhyne, Federal, State and Local
Jurisdiction Over Civil Aviation, 11 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 459, 469-83 (1946).
7 AIRLINES REPORT 44; Maclay & Burt, Entry of New Carriers Into Domestic
Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. Am L. & Com. 131, 133, 135, 137-38 (1955).
8 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §102(d), 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. §1302(d)
(1958). The CAB itself has commented upon the subject of competition frequently.
Thus in IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B. 639, 643-44 (1946), it wrote:
"The competition contemplated by the Civil Aeronautics Act is not the unlimited
and uncontrolled competition which permits destructive rates having no relation to
the cost of operation but having the power to provoke subsidy wars among nations.
The Civil Aeronautics Act as construed by this Board provides regulated competi-
tion which seeks to avoid the stifling influence of monopoly on the one hand and the
economic anarchism of unrestrained competition on the other."
9 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958).
See notes 207-12 infra and accompanying text.
i0 AIRLINES REPORT 49. Compare Note, Regulated Industries and the Anti-Trust
Laws: Substantive and Procedural Coordination, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 679-81
(1958).
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The issue remains, however, whether any useful purpose is achieved
by subjecting such a highly regulated industry to controls designed
to foster competition. 1
ENTRY
Necessity of License
A prominent feature of the federal legislation is the requirement
that a carrier obtain a certificate from the CAB before the commence-
ment of operations. 2 The CAB is directed to issue such a certificate
if it finds that the applicant is fit, willing, and able to perform the
transportation described in the application and that such transportation
is required for the public convenience and necessity. 3 Economic
control over entry, however, reaches only common carriers: private
carriers require no certificate. 4 In addition, the CAB is empowered
to classify common carriers and to exempt some such carriers from
the requirement of certification. 5 In the absence of an exemption, the
existence of more than one application for a given route compels the
CAB to hold a hearing in which the merits of the respective applica-
tions may be compared. In other words, when applications are mu-
tually exclusive, each applicant is entitled to appear before the CAB
11 AIRLINES REPORT 51-53. As to the necessity of regulation, see KEYEs, FEDERAL
CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO Am TRANSPORTATION 331 (1951); WiLcox, op. cit. supra
note 6, at 619; Nelson, Patterns of Competition and Monopoly in Present-Day Trans-
port and Implications for Public Policy, 26 LAiN EcoN. 232 (1950). Many state
commissions disavow the notion of competition in regulated industries. They speak
instead of regulated monopoly. E.g., Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co., 92 P.U.R. (n.s.)
370, 381-82 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1951) ; Village of Brookfield v. Goldblatt Bros.,
33 P.U.R. (n.s.) 82, 92 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1940).
12 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(a), 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(a)
(1958).
13Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §401(d)(1), 72 Stat. 755, 49 U.S.C
§ 1371(d) (1) (1958). Subsection (g) provides that the Board may amend, modify,
or suspend certificates. Subsection (k) (4) provides that the holding of a certificate
is made conditional on compliance with the Railway Labor Act, tit. II, added by
49 Stat. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1958). Section 401(e) of the former
Civil Aeronautics Act, ch. 61, 52 Stat. 988 (1938), contained a "grandfather" clause
whereby carriers previously in operation automatically received certificates.
14 Pan Am. Ferry Flight, 18 C.A.B. 214, 219-20 (1953); Page Airways, Inc.
Investigation, 6 C.A.B. 1016, 1064-65 (1946); Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§§ 101(3), (10), (21), 401(a), 72 Stat. 737, 754, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301(3), (10), (21),
1371(a) (1958) ; Neal, Status of Non-Scheduled Operations Under the Civil Aero-
nautics Act of 1938, 11 Lw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 508, 515-21 (1946).
15 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 416, 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1958).
See Standard Airlines, Inc., Exemption Request, 9 C.A.B. 583, 585 (1948). But see
Consolidated Flour Shipments, Inc.-Bay Area Violation, 17 C.A.B. 45 (1953), aff'd,
213 F2d 814 (9th Cir. 1954). Some inadvertent exclusion from the industry may
result from the complexity of regulations promulgated by the CAB pursuant to
statutory authority. The prescribed content of air carrier tariffs, for example, might
discourage would-be carriers. 14 C.F.R. §§221.30-.41, .121 (1956).
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and to contest the fitness and suitability of the other applicants for
the route in question. 6
CAB Policy With Respect to Entry
In the past there was much criticism of the CAB on the ground
that it pursued a policy of limiting entry and extending the routes of
existing carriers rather than licensing wholly new enterprises." In
the absence of regulation, entry would be relatively easy and, in the
period immediately following World War II, the abundance of former
military pilots and equipment provided ample means for the establish-
ment of new and enlarged airlines.' But in considering the CAB's
policies with respect to entry, care must be taken to focus on specific
routes: the total number of air carriers in the United States is not a
meaningful figure; the number of certificates is material only in relation
to the specific route under consideration. 9
Where no carrier has been authorized to serve a route, the CAB
generally issues the first certificate when potential traffic appears ade-
quate to support the services of one carrier.2 0 But since subsidy pay-
ments are usually involved, the CAB will deny such a certificate when
it believes that the cost to the treasury will outweigh the public benefits
to be derived from the service.21 When doubt exists as to the volume
of traffic to be expected, the CAB has resorted to the desirable expedient
of issuing a temporary certificate on a "use it or lose it" basis so as to
determine from actual operations whether points along the route can
generate enough traffic to warrant certification of the first carrier.
16 Delta Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 228 F.2d 17, 21-22 (D.C. Cir. 1955) ; Northwest
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339, 343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1952). This is the so-called
"Ashbacker" rule, which originated in Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S.
327 (1945).
17 KEyEs, op. cit. suPra note 11, at 8-11, 170-75, 240-41; Maclay & Burt, supra
note 7, at 131, 132.
18 Note, Civil Aeronautics Board Policy: An Evaluation, 57 YALE L.J. 1053,
1058-71 (1948).
19 See KEYEs, op. cit. sipra note 11, at 47.
20 See southeastern Area Local Serv., IA Av. L. RFP. 22342 (C.A.B. Dec. 18,
1959); Guatemala-Los Angeles-San Francisco Serv., 21 C.A.B. 464, 467 (1955);
Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 456, 457 (1955) ; Southern Certificate Renewal,
17 C.A.B. 116, 119-20 (1953); Trans-Tex. Certificate Renewal, 12 C.A.B. 606,
614 (1951); New England, 7 C.A.B. 27 (1946); KEYEs, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 115; cf. North Cent. Route Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 106 (1953).
21Frontier Airlines, Inc., Temporary Intermediate Points, IA Av. L. REP.
722338 (C.A.B. Dec. 4, 1959); Renewal of Trans-Tex. Airways' Temporary In-
termediate Points, 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22332 (C.A.B. Nov. 13, 1959); Service to Santa
Catalina Island, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122330 (C.A.B. Nov. 12, 1959); Pacific Northwest
Local Serv., 1A Av. L. RP. 122299 (C.A.B. Aug. 21, 1959); Braniff Airways,
Kansas City-New Orleans Serv., 2 C.A.B. 727, 746-47 (1941); Northwest Airlines,
Additional Serv. to Can., 2 C.A.B. 627, 641 (1941); United Airlines, Red Bluff
Operation, 1 C.A.A. 778, 787-90 (1940); All Am. Aviation, Pick-up, Delivery Serv.,
2 C.A.B. 133, 149 (1940) (dictum).
22 Montana Local Serv., 1A Av. L. RaP. 1 22290, 22296 (C.A.B. July 29, 1959);
South Cent. Area Local Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22292 (C.A.B. July 14, 1959) (sup-
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A more difficult question is presented where one carrier has already
received a certificate to operate over a route and the CAB must decide
whether to license a second airline. In recent years, the carriers have
shown increased financial strength and the CAB has exhibited a cor-
responding willingness to grant second certificates.' Furthermore, it
is not incumbent upon the second applicant to show that existing service
is inadequate, for the Board has indicated that it will consider compe-
tion desirable in passing upon applications for second-carrier cer-
tificates :
We need not detail the advantages of competition, nor to
prove them again in each case. An objective reading of the Civil
Aeronautics Act leaves no doubt that the lawmakers consider
competition to be a desirable objective which should be established
whenever it is economically feasible and will contribute to the
development of a sound national air transportation system.
24
The phrase "competition for competition's sake" is meaning-
less, since in every case there are numerous considerations bearing
on the public interest. The overall public interest is the principle
by which we measure each decision. Public interest can only be
determined after the Board has considered all the factors and
circumstances surrounding the case, and in such consideration
the Board does not give weight to an empty phrase, but rather
to such factors as volume of potential traffic, total operating costs,
benefits to the public in the form of improved service, financial
condition of the carriers, and many other factors which contribute
to the constant improvement of air transportation.
2 5
plemental opinon); Braniff Airways, Serv. to Fairmont & Fort Dodge, 20 C.A.B.
720, 738 (1955); Rocky Mountain States Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 695, 730-32 (1946).
The CAB has refused to authorize a new route merely to provide single carrier
through service where the existing service is adequate. Braniff Airways, Kansas City-
New Orleans Serv., 2 C.A.B. 727, 745-46 (1941). In other cases the Board has said
that the importance of a city justified direct service to distant points. Northeast
Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 686, 691 (1944). Compare Portland-Seattle Serv., 17 C.A.B.
682, 683-87 (1953). Often the licensing of a new route requires consideration of
competition because the route may parallel an existing flight line. Fairbanks Area,
17 C.A.B. 372, 384, 387, 389 (1953). As to the terminals entitled to service, see text
accompanying notes 53-56 infra; Southern Certificate Renewal, 17 C.A.B. 116,
177-79 (1953).
23 See Pacific Northwest-Hawaii Renewal, 1A Av. L. REP. 22369 (C.A.B.
April 1, 1960); Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, IA Av. L. REP. 1122270 (C.A.B.
May 19, 1959) ; Western Airlines Serv. to Sioux Falls, 20 C.A.B. 757, 778-81 (1955) ;
Additional Serv. to the Va. Peninsula, 20 C.A.B. 273, 289 (1955); West Coast-
Hawaii, 20 C.A.B. 7 (1955); Southern Serv. to the West, 18 C.A.B. 790, 799,
reopened, 19 C.A.B. 309, 310 (1954) ; New England, 7 C.A.B. 27, 36 (1946) ; Rocky
Mountain States Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 695, 740 (1946); Florida Case, 6 C.A.B.
765, 770 (1946) ; Braniff Airways, Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B. 353,
376-77, 386 (1940). See generally Taaffe, A Map Analysis of United States Airline
Competition, 25 J. AiR L. & Com. 121, 129-47 (1958). Compare States-Alaska, 20
C.A.B. 791, 801-04 (1955), with id. at 819-22 (dissenting opinion).
24 Southern Serv. to the West, 18 C.A.B. 790, 799-800 (1954). See Additional
Serv. to Puerto Rico, 12 C.A.B. 430, 485-86 (1951) ; Hawaiian Intraterritorial Serv.,
10 C.A.B. 62, 66 (1948); Mid-Continent Airlines, Kansas City-New Orleans, 6
C.A.B. 253 (1945).
25 Northeast Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 686, 690 (1944).
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There is a strong, although not conclusive, presumption in
favor of competition on any route which offers sufficient traffic
to support competing services without unreasonable increase of
total operating cost.
2 6
In many other instances, however, the CAB has denied a second
certificate on a route on the grounds that the traffic is inadequate to
support two carriers and that the costs of multiple operation would
increase subsidy payments 2  In some instances, the granting of a
second certificate has been restricted so as to minimize the fiscal impact
on competing carriers.2 On the other hand, the CAB has from time
to time used its power to grant a second certificate in order to compel
the rendering of adequate service, much in the same manner as does
the Interstate Commerce Commission in the motor carrier field 9
26 Colonial Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 552, 555 (1944). See BiGHAm & ROBERTS,
op. cit. supra note 6, at 113; KEYEs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 126-27, 131-32. A
temporary certificate of a second line has been renewed despite the offer of the
first carrier in the field to operate without subsidy if the second carrier's temporary
authority were terminated. Trans-Pac. Airlines Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 253, 266 (1955).
It is clear that the CAB may grant a second certificate on a route without finding
that the existing service is inadequate; the grant of the second certificate may be
upheld simply upon a finding that competition in and of itself is desirable. Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 271 F.2d 752, 759 (2d Cir. 1959); Maclay & Burt, supra
note 7, at 139-41. Compare Coyle Lines, Inc. v. United States, 115 F. Supp. 272, 278
(E.D. La. 1953); Surface-Mail-by-Air Exemptions, 20 C.A.B. 658, 660 (1955);
Transcontinental & W. Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 373, 374 (1943) ; Continental Airlines,
Inc., 4 C.A.B. 215, 234 (1943) ; Gellman, supra note 3, at 174-77.
27 Service to Santa Catalina Island, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122330 (C.A.B. Nov. 12,
1959); Bristol Bay Area Trunkline, 17 C.A.B. 1109, 1119 (1953); Tulsa, Wichita
Falls, & Cent. Serv., 17 C.A.B. 1017, 1083 (1953); Alaska Route Modification, 17
C.A.B. 943, 984-86 (1953); Portland-Seattle Serv., 17 C.A.B. 682 (1953); Southern
Serv. to the West, 12 C.A.B. 518, 526-27, 529, 530-35 (1951), reopened, 18 C.A.B.
234 (1953), reopened, 18 C.A.B. 790 (1954); Great Lakes Area, 8 C.A.B. 360, 370
(1947); North Cent., 7 C.A.B. 639, 643-45, 647-52 (1946); West Coast, 6 C.A.B.
961, 969-72, 976-77 (1946); Florida Case, 6 C.A.B. 765, 772, 774 (1946); Rocky
Mountain States Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 695, 740-41 (1946); Northwest Airlines,
Additional Serv. to Can., 2 C.A.B. 627, 633-41 (1941); United Airlines, Red Bluff
Operation, 1 C.A.A. 778, 779-80 (1940) ; WiLcox, op. cit. supra note 6, at 640; see
AnRLINEs REPORT 105; KEYES, op. cit. supra note 11, at 131-32, 142, 311; Gellman,
upra note 3, at 429-30; Maclay & Burt, supra note 7, at 136-37. See generally
Berge, Subsidies and Competition as Factors in Air Transport Policy, 41 PROCEEDINGS
Am. ECON. Ass'N 519, 520 (1951). In United Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 155 F.2d 169,
172 (D.C. Cir. 1946), the Board decided to establish a new route from Denver to
Los Angeles. It found the traffic sufficient to support only one carrier and then
proceeded to pick that carrier from the applicants for the route. The court appears
to have held the procedure proper. Note that competition may also exist along
alternate, parallel routes. E.g., Mid-Continent Airlines, Twin Cities-St. Louis Opera-
tion, 2 C.A.B. 63, 93 (1940).
28 Additional Serv. to the Va. Peninsula, 20 C.A.B. 273, 286 (1955); Rocky
Mountain States Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 695, 736 (1946); KEYES, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 307. Additional data concerning the imposition of restrictions will be found in
text accompanying notes 57-72 infra.
29Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122270 (C.A.B. May 19,
1959) ; Las Vegas-Los Angeles Restriction, 17 C.A.B. 23, 24-25 (1953); Caribbean
Area, 9 C.A.B. 534, 540-42 (1948); Richmond, Creating Competition Among the
Airlines, 24 J. Am L. & Com. 435, 436-37 (1957).
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Similar considerations are applicable to the granting of the third
and subsequent certificates on the same route." Additional certificates
were granted by the CAB in three waves, one at the end of World
War II, another in 1949, and another in 1954-1956. By 1958 compe-
tition had been authorized over eighty-seven per cent of the routes.31
In that year twelve routes had five or more carriers and one route,
New York to Washington, had nine." At the same time, the CAB
has denied multiple certificates in numerous cases 83 and occasionally
has used its power to restrict licenses in order to lessen the competitive
impact of new certificates. 4
Selection of Carrier 3
It appears that there has not been extensive litigation with respect
to the fitness of applicants for certificates. Perhaps because subsidies
are available, there has usually seemed to be an ample supply of
30 New York-San Francisco Nonstop Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. 122304 (C.A.B.
Sept. 2, 1959); States-Alaska, 20 C.A.B. 791, 808-09 (1955); Air Freight, 10
C.A.B. 572, 585-86 (1949), aff'd, 192 F.2d 417 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Transcontinental &
W. Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943); see Milwaukee-Chicago-New York
Restriction, 11 C.A.B. 310, 330-31 (1950) (dictum), rev'd on other grounds, 194
F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1952) ; id. at 336 (dissenting opinion) ; cf. Taaffe, supra note 23,
at 136-37.
31 Smith, Regulation of Returns to Transportation Agencies, 24 LAw &
CONTE1MP. PRoB. 702, 718 (1959) ; Taaffe, supra note 23, at 129-36, 146.
32 See 1957 CAB ANN. REP. 2-3. In at least one instance the CAB appears to
have granted a certificate to an additional carrier merely because that carrier was
in financial difficulties and might have had to suspend service if it could not obtain
additional profitable routes. Service to Puerto Rico, IA Av. L. REP. 22295 (C.A.B.
June 25, 1959) (supplemental opinion).
33 Cleveland-New York Nonstop Serv., 21 C.A.B. 760, 764 (1955); Southern
Certificate Renewal, 17 C.A.B. 116, 166-70 (1953); Southern Serv. to the West,
12 C.A.B. 518, 524-25, 529 (1951), reopened, 18 C.A.B. 234 (1953), reopened, 18
C.A.B. 790, petition granted, 19 C.A.B. 309 (1954) ; Cincinnati-New York Additional
Serv., 8 C.A.B. 152, 156-58, 160-61 (1947); North Cent, 7 C.A.B. 639, 652-53
(1946) ; West Coast, 6 C.A.B. 961, 964-66, 975-76 (1946). Compare Transcontinental
Coach-Type Serv., 14 C.A.B. 720, 724-25 (1951).
34 E.g., Cleveland-New York Nonstop Serv., 21 C.A.B. 760, 764 (1955). Occa-
sionally the CAB has used its power to grant certificates to additional carriers in
order to compel improvements in existing service. New York-San Francisco Nonstop
Serv., IA Av. L. REP. ff 22304 (C.A.B. Sept. 2, 1959); ef. Fairbanks Area, 17 C.A.B.
372 (1953).
35 We have made no study of the international aspects of air carrier regulation
inasmuch as they involve considerations not applicable to domestic problems. The
CAB, of course, has little control over foreign service, foreign rates, and so forth.
Presidential approval is required before the grant of a foreign route to a domestic
applicant, but not before the grant of an exemption. Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§§ 416, 801, 72 Stat. 771, 782, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1386, 1461 (1958) ; Pan Am. World Air-
ways v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 912 (1959).
On the other hand, because of the requirement of presidential approval, there is no
judicial review of the award of an international certificate. Chicago & So. Airlines v.
Waterman S.S. Co., 333 U.S. 103 (1948). The International Civil Aviation Organi-
zation has merely advisory powers over international traffic, so national discretion is
paramount. It is often urged that each nation should grant a monopoly of foreign
routes to a single carrier. E.g., Latin Am. Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 857, 861-66 (1946) ;
MANCE, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 44, 60 (1944). But the CAB has rejected
this "chosen instrument!' concept. Pan Am. Airways v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810, 817
(2d Cir. 1941) ; Pan Am. World Airways, Damascus & Teheran Serv., 19 C.A.B. 697
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qualified applicants for routes.3 6  But the CAB has, on occasion,
denied certificates as punishment for operators who have violated the
statute or regulations thereunder.
37
In selecting the applicant to whom a route is to be awarded from
among those found fit, the CAB gives some weight to historical
factors. Thus if one applicant has pioneered the route and developed
greater experience on it, the certificate may be awarded to him.3" An-
other consideration is the interest of the carrier in developing the route
to its full potential. Typically, this means that a feeder carrier which
has a limited number of routes will secure the award as against a trunk
line with numerous longer routes to serve.39  Another factor given
(1954) ; Latin Am. Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 857, 860, 864-65, 879-80, 883-85, 889 (1946) ;
Northeast Airlines, No. Atl. Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319, 323, 325 (1945); American
Export Airlines, Trans-Atl. Serv., 2 C.A.B. 16, 29-31, 34 (1940), aff'd in part, reed
in; part on other grounds, 121 F.2d 810 (2d Cir. 1941); KEYES, op. cit. supra note 11,
at 127, 132-34; 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 36; Note, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1205-06
(1951). Yet it does not necessarily follow that the CAB stands ready to grant
second and third certificates on every route. Trans World-Pan Am., London/Frank-
furt-Rome Serv., 20 C.A.B. 441, 443 (1555); Chicago & So. Air Lines, Maracaibo
Serv., 19 C.A.B. 710, 729 (1954) (dictum); Keyes, A Reconsideration of Federal
Control of Entry into Air Transportation, 22 J. ArR L. & Com. 192, 195 (1955).
Compare Whitehorse Flying Serv., Irregular Canada-United States Serv., 20 C.A.B. 1
(1955); Samoan Airlines, 18 C.A.B. 533 (1954). In choosing among applicants
for foreign routes, the CAB has taken account of considerations of economy and of
balancing of routes. Northeast Airlines, No. Atl. Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319, 340-45
(1945); Trans World-Pan Am., London/Frankfurt-Rome Serv., 20 C.A.B. 441,
442-46 (1955); KEYEs, op. cit. supra note 11, at 128-30.
Issuance of American permits to foreign flag carriers is largely controlled by
treaty. See Aerovias Venezolanas, Foreign Permit, 20 C.A.B. 746 (1955); Linea
Aeropostal Venezolana, Foreign Permit, 20 C.A.B. 419 (1955) ; Empresa Quatemalteca
de Aviacion, Foreign Permit, 19 C.A.B. 834, 837 (1955); Japan Air Lines, Naha,
Okinawa-Hong Kong Serv., 19 C.A.B. 378 (1954); Iberia, New York-Madrid Serv.,
19 C.A.B. 81, 87 (1954); Taca Intl Airlines, Foreign Permit, 18 C.A.B. 737, 751
(1954); Airwork Ltd., London-Prestwick-New York Serv., 18 C.A.B. 542, 550-51
(1954); Aerovias Interamericanas, Tocumen-Miami Serv., 18 C.A.B. 510, 518-19
(1954); Japan Air Lines, Foreign Permit, 18 C.A.B. 359 (1953); Rutas, Aereas
Nacionales, So. Am., Foreign Permit, 18 C.A.B. 302 (1953); Sabena, Foreign
Permit, 17 C.A.B. 1103 (1953); Philippine Air Lines, Foreign Permit Amendment,
17 C.A.B. 361 (1953); Northwest Airlines, Additional Serv. to Can., 2 C.A.B. 627,
630-32 (1941) (dictum). See generally Stoffel, Anterican Bilateral Air Transport
Agreements, 26 J. Am L. & Com. 119 (1959).
6Note, however, the limitation on CAB's powers expressed in Braniff Air-
ways, Inc. v. CAB, 147 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Note also the objection to the
granting of certificate voiced in the dissenting opinion in Trans-Tex. Certificate
Renewal, 12 C.A.B. 606, 636-39 (1951).
3 7 Large Irregular Carriers, Exemptions, 11 C.A.B. 609, 618 (1950); Hawaiian
Intraterritorial Serv., 10 C.A.B. 62, 67 (1948). Compare Mansfield journal Co. v.
FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Affiliation with another carrier may
disqualify the applicant. E.g., American President Lines Petition, 7 C.A.B. 799,
802-03 (1947).
38 Service to Santa Catalina Island, 1A Av. L. RFP. fr 22330 (C.A.B. Nov. 12,
1959). But see Braniff Airways, Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B.
353, 386-87 (1940); All Am. Aviation, Pick-up, Delivery Serv., 2 C.A.B. 133, 146
(1940). The 1938 legislation contained a "grandfather clause!' under which many
important certificates issued. See note 13 supra.
39 Additional Serv. to the Va. Peninsula, 20 C.A.B. 273, 285 (1955); Klamath
Falls-Medford Serv., 17 C.A.B. 713 (1953); Continental Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 1,
18-19 (1942).
1961]
320 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
weight by the CAB is the relative cost of service. If one of the appli-
cants, for example, already has a base at one or both ends of the route,
it may well be preferred over another applicant who would be com-
pelled to establish a base at one or more terminals and thus would
be unable to spread the terminal costs over several routes.40
The foregoing factors may be considered economic in that they
tend to encourage the development of service at the least cost. Per-
haps more important, however, are two other considerations. First,
the CAB seeks to award routes to the weaker of two or more appli-
cants in order to balance the strength of the various certificated air-
lines. Thus, in a recent case in which West Coast and Northwest
were both applicants for a Spokane to Calgary route, one reason the
CAB granted the certificate to West Coast was that Northwest was
not on subsidy while West Coast was, and the Board thought the
award would result in reducing West Coast's subsidy needs.4 Again,
in the Norfolk-Atlanta Non-Stop case, the CAB granted a certificate
to Capital Airlines instead of Eastern because Eastern had greater
financial and operational resources.42
Second and closely allied is the consideration of avoiding diver-
sion of traffic and thus mitigating the competitive impact of a new
certificate. For example, when four airlines applied for a certificate
on the Denver to Los Angeles run, the CAB found that only one addi-
tional carrier was needed. United, one of the applicants, had lines
running east of Denver, but had enabled its customers to secure
through service to Los Angeles by means of an interchange arrange-
ment with Western, which was certificated on a Denver-Los Angeles
run. The CAB eliminated United from consideration on the ground
that to grant the new certificate to that airline would deny Western
40 Southeastern Area Local Serv., IA Av. L. REP. 1122342 (C.A.B. Dec. 18,
1959); New York-San Francisco Nonstop Serv., IA Av. L. REP. 122304 (C.A.B.
Sept. 2, 1959) ; Montana Local Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. [ 22296 (C.A.B. July 29, 1959)
(supplemental opinion); Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122270
(C.A.B. May 19, 1959); Continental Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 215, 233-34 (1943);
Delta Airlines, Serv. to Atlanta & Birmingham, 2 C.A.B. 447, 479-80 (1941) ; Mid-
Continent Airlines, Twin Cities-St. Louis Operation, 2 C.A.B. 63, 93 (1940). Some-
times the ability of an applicant to render through service affects the CAB's choice
of carrier. Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 109 (1946); Braniff Airways Houston-
Memphis-Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B. 353, 386 (1940).
41 Spokane-Calgary Route, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122367 (C.A.B. March 2, 1960);
see Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 86, 90 (1955); Continental Airlines, Inc.,
4 C.A.B. 1, 18 (1942).
42Norfolk-Atlanta Nonstop Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 295, 298 (1955). Accord,
Additional North-South Serv., 17 C.A.B. 1017, 1019 (1953); Florida Case, 6 C.A.B.
765, 773-74 (1946) ; Colonial Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 552, 560 (1944). See Ameri-
can Airlines, Chicago-Detroit Local Serv., 20 C.A.B. 565, 584-86 (1955) (dissenting
opinion) ; BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 506; Taaffe, supra note 23,
at 146. Compare Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 108-09 (1946).
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the interchange traffic it previously received from United.4" Here
again, the CAB, while ready to permit entry in limited numbers,
sought to do so in a manner that would limit competition to a level
thought to be desirable.
The CAB has attempted to promote what it believes to be con-
structive, but not destructive, competition:
If air carriers are to be prevented from inaugurating improve-
ments in existing service solely as a protection to a particular
carrier or carriers, the development of an adequate air transpor-
tation system will be retarded . . . . It is of greatest importance
. . . to maintain a properly balanced system of air transporta-
tion in every section of the country in order to encourage con-
structive competition. That healthy competition is presumed to
be beneficial to the public may be inferred from various congres-
sional expressions. It represents the economic philosophy under-
lying the antitrust acts.4
In evaluating the extent of competition, we reiterate that con-
clusions must be based on the number of airlines certificated on
specific routes 45 as opposed to the number of airlines in the entire
United States. It is common to complain that the "Big Four" carry
some seventy per cent of the domestic traffic,4" but unrelated to specific
routes such figures are meaningless. Furthermore, account must be
taken of the recently granted certificates whereby many routes have
acquired the services of two or more carriers.4 Nevertheless, the
overwhelming weight of informed opinion is that the CAB has been
restrictive and that its policies with respect to entry have considerably
inhibited competition.4
43 Western Airlines, Denver-Los Angeles Serv., 6 C.A.B. 199 (1944), aff'd sub
1o27. United Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 155 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1946); see Cleveland-
New York Nonstop Serv., 21 C.A.B. 760, 763 (1955); Tulsa, Wichita Falls & Cent.
Serv., 17 C.A.B. 1017, 1018-19 (1953); North Cent., 8 C.A.B. 477 (1947) (supple-
mental opinion); Great Lakes Area, 8 C.A.B. 360, 364-77 (1947); Hawaiian Case,
7 C.A.B. 83, 110 (1946); Continental Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 1, 17-18 (1942);
Mid-Continent Airlines, Twin Cities-St. Louis Operation, 2 C.A.B. 63, 92-93 (1940).
See also Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122270 (C.A.B. May 19,
1959).
44 Braniff Airways, Houston-Memphis-Louisville Route, 2 C.A.B. 353, 386
(1940).
45But see Continental Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 1, 18 (1942); Delta Airlines,
Serv. to Atlanta & Birmingham, 2 C.A.B. 447, 480 (1941).
40 BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 115; WESTMEYER, EcoNomics OF
TRANSPORTATION 543 (1952); Maclay & Burt, supra note 7, at 155. Normally, of
course, an existing carrier can serve a contiguous new route at lower cost because
it need not duplicate terminal and other costs at the junction point, and such over-
head can be charged to a greater volume of traffic.
47See AmLINES REPORT 110-13; EASTERN AIRLINES ANN. REP. 12 (1957). Com-
pare Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 86, 99 (1955) (dissenting opinion);
Healy, Workable Competition in Air Transportation, 35 PROCEEDINGS Am. EcoN.
AsS'N 229 (1945) ; Richmond, supra note 29, at 436-37.
4 8 BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 6, at 505-07. See generally KEYES,
op. cit. supra note 11, at 171-75; WILcox, op. cit. supra note 6, at 641; Adams, The Role
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SCOPE OF LICENSE
Routes
Certificates granted by the CAB narrowly define the routes over
which carriers may operate.4 9 In the recent Northeastern States Area
Investigation,"0 for example, a certificate granted to Mohawk to serve
Jamestown was specifically restricted against service from New York
City to Jamestown, that service already being provided by Allegheny.
Carriers who stray from their routes may find themselves the objects
of enforcement proceedings. 5 The whole question of conformation of
routes is, of course, closely related-to the issue of entry. Changes in
routes and restrictions thereon cause immediate effects upon competi-
tive situations. 2
of Competition in the Regulated Industries, 48 PROCEEDINGS Am. EcoN. Ass'N 527, 539
(1958) ; Durham & Feldstein, Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air
Freight Industry, 34 VA. L. REv. 769, 808-09 (1948) ; Keyes, supra note 6, at 288;
Keyes, supra note 35, at 192, 194-98; Maclay & Burt, supra note 7, at 151-55. But
note the contention that economies of scale are present and that small trunk lines in
any event could not compete effectively with large ones because their costs are
higher. Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1196, 1207-10 (1951). The CAB appears in many cases
to have created competition incidentally and not by design. Richmond, supra note 29,
at 439, 443, 445. Such inadvertent competition may result from extension of routes
and the like. As the CAB has no authority to limit the equipment which the carrier
may use on a given route, see text accompanying note 73 infra, the grant of a second
certificate must be intended to create competition and not merely to increase the
quantity of service.
4 9 Regulations with respect to charter service will be found in 14 C.F.R.
§§207.5, .7 (1951).
50 IA Av. L. REP. f122357 (C.A.B. Feb. 19, 1960). See Charleston-Columbus,
19 C.A.B. 731, 734-35 (1955); Texas Local Serv., 18 C.A.B. 34, 48-49 (1953);
Alaska Route Modification, 17 C.A.B. 943 (1953); Great Lakes Area, 8 C.A.B. 360,
372-77 (1947); Cincinnati-New York Additional Serv., 8 C.A.B. 152, 156, 158, 160
(1947); Latin Am. Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 857, 918 (1946); Rocky Mountain States
Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 695 (1946). Most of the foregoing cases do not involve the
imposition of restrictions but do illustrate the narrow scope of the routes granted
by CAB certificates.
51 Pacific No. Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 592, 610
(D. Alaska 1948); AIRLINES REPORT 75-76.
52 See Northeastern States Area Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. 1122357 (C.A.B.
Feb. 19, 1960); Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 86, 91 (1955); Service to
Trenton, 20 C.A.B. 290, 311-12 (1955); Trans-Pac. Certificate Renewal, 20 C.A.B.
47, 54-56, 57-62, 65-66, 72, reopened, 21 C.A.B. 253 (1955); West Coast-Hawaii,
20 C.A.B. 7, 13 (1955); Trans-Tex. Certificate Renewal, 12 C.A.B. 606, 616-17
(1951) (separate opinion); Northeast Airlines, No. Atl. Routes, 6 C.A.B. 319,
326-27 (1945). The CAB policies thereon and competitive consequences are dis-
cussed in FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL AIR TRANSPORTATION 199-200 (1955); GIL &
BATES, AIRLINE COMPETITION 3-4, 23, 25, 186-87 (1949) ; KYYES, op. cit. stpra note 11,
at 109-10, 121-22, 249, 272; Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Among Domestic
Trunk Airlines, 20 J. Am L. & Com. 379, 384-85, 387, 396, 402 (1953); Gellman,
supra note 3, at 429; Howell, The Rate of Return in Air Transport, 24 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 677, 687 (1959); Kahn, Regulatory Agencies and Industrial Rela-
tions: The Air Lines Case, 42 Am. EcoN. REV. 686 (1952); Keyes, supra note 6,
at 280, 289-304; Koontz, Economic and Managerial Factors Underlying Subsidy Deeds
of Domestic Trunk Line Air Carriers, 18 J. AIR L. & CoM. 127, 144-45. 149 '51
(1951); Richmond, supra note 29, at 435, 438-39, 441, 446; Saunders, The Airline
Flight From Reality, Fortune, Feb. 1956, pp. 90, 92; Taaffe, supra note 23, at 146;




Terminal To Be Served
The Federal Aviation Act requires that each certificate specify
the terminal points and intermediate points which the carrier is to
serve.53 Hence the CAB restricts certificates to specific terminals and
does not grant authority to serve general geographic areas. 4  Indeed,
the CAB is apt to insist upon service to specific airports,5" a require-
ment closely allied to its insistence that carriers serve unprofitable as.
well as profitable routes.56
Restrictions
Certificates frequently contain restrictions against various types
of service. It is common, for example, for the CAB to issue a cer-
tificate permitting flight between points A and E but prohibiting non-
stop service; that is, the certificate requires a mandatory stop at some
one or more intermediate points B, C, and D.57 Those restrictions
are closely related to the status of trunk and feeder carriers: usually
feeder carriers may not provide nonstop service between trunk line
terminals.5" From time to time, mandatory stop restrictions have
53 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401 (e), 72 Stat. 754, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)
(Supp. 1959). An air carrier may change airports at the certified point only by
filing notice with the CAB and waiting thirty days. 14 C.F.R. § 202.3 (1956).
54 Aerovias Sud Americana, Inc., Certificate Renewal, 1A Av. L. RE_. 22320,
(C.A.B. Oct. 29, 1959); Durham & Feldstein, supra note 48, at 794-95.
55 Flint-Grand Rapids Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122377
(C.A.B. April 29, 1960); Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation,
IA Av. L. REP. 22376 (C.A.B. April 29, 1960); Southeastern Area Local Serv.,
IA Av. L. REP. 122342 (C.A.B. Dec. 18, 1959); States-Alaska, 20 C.A.B. 791,
806-08 (1955).
56 South Cent. Area Local Serv., 1A Av. L. ReP. 1122292 (C.A.B. July 14, 1959)
(supplemental opinion); States-Alaska, 20 C.A.B. 791, 811-12 (1955); Braniff Air-
ways, Serv. to Fairmont & Fort Dodge, 20 C.A.B. 720 (1955); Transcontinental
Coach-Type Serv., 14 C.A.B. 720, 723 (1951). Compare Flying Tiger Line, Inc.,
Air-Truck Serv., 1A Av. L. ReP. 1122329 (C.A.B. Nov. 12, 1959); Alaska Route
Modification, 17 C.A.B. 943, 945-47 (1953); West Coast, 6 C.A.B. 961, 979-80
(1946) ; Panagra Terminal Investigation, 4 C.A.B. 670, 673 (1944), rehearing denied,
154 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1946), dismissed per curiam, 332 U.S. 827 (1947). See text
accompanying notes 173-80, 192-95 infra with respect to CAB's powers to compel
service generally.
57 Northeastern States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 11122357, 22341
(C.A.B. Feb. 19, 1960; Dec. 15, 1959); Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, IA Av.
L. REP. 22307 (C.A.B. Sept. 15, 1959) (supplemental opinion); Pacific Northwest
Local Serv., IA Av. L. REP. 11 22299 (C.A.B. Aug. 21, 1959) (supplemental opinion);
Montana Local Serv., IA Av. L. REP. 1 22296 (C.A.B. July 29, 1959) (supplemental
opinion); Western Airlines, Inc. v. Frontier Airlines, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122287 (C.A.B.
Jan. 24, 1959); Southern Certificate Renewal, 17 C.A.B. 116, 118-19 (1953); New
York-Houston Interchange, 16 C.A.B. 603, 630-31 (1952); Continental Air Lines,
Route Consolidation, 10 C.A.B. 657, 661-65 (1949); Cincinnati-New York Addi-
tional Serv., 8 C.A.B. 152, 162-63 (1947); All Am. Aviation, Pick-Up, Delivery Serv.,
2 C.A.B. 133, 146 (1940) ; GIL & BATEs, op. cit. supra note 52, at 117-18, 201, 267-69.
58 Southeastern Area Local Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. f[22342 (C.A.B. Dec. 18,
1959); Montana Local Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. 1122290 (C.A.B. July 2, 1959).
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been lifted by the CAB. In one case, restrictions were removed for
all three carriers serving the same nonstop route, the Board saying:
Operating conditions imposed in certificates issued by the
Board have played an important part in the early development of
a sound air transportation pattern. In the past it has frequently
been necessary in authorizing new services where the traffic flow
was not unusually heavy to limit their impact upon existing car-
riers by imposing such restrictions. In the instant case, however,
it is apparent that the conditions have outlived their usefulness
and are now merely serving unduly to inhibit improved service
59
Lifting of a mandatory stop restriction, however, requires a compara-
tive hearing on the theory that a new route is awarded."0 Perhaps as
a consequence, in many instances restrictions have remained in the
carriers' certificates.6 1
Another commonly utilized limitation prohibits "shuttle" or
"turnaround" service and is frequently referred to as a "long-haul"
restriction. Such a condition was imposed, for example, upon East-
ern's certificate to serve Milwaukee, preventing the airline from run-
ning a shuttle service between Milwaukee and Minneapolis and
requiring it to initiate its flights at Louisville or points south.6 2  Just
as the mandatory stop restrictions are designed to protect the trunk
lines from the competition of feeder carriers, so the long-haul restric-
tions are intended to shelter the feeders from trunk line competition on
59Louisville-New York Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 794, 796-97 (1955). Accord,
Northeastern States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 11122357, 22341 (C.A.B.
Feb. 19, 1960; Dec. 15, 1959); United Restriction, 21 C.A.B. 767, 769 (1955);
Portland-Seattle Serv., 17 C.A.B. 682, 687 (1953); Continental Airlines, Route
Consolidation, 10 C.A.B. 657, 673 (1949). The procedure for removal of a restric-
tion involves filing a new schedule with the CAB. 14 C.F.R. §202.2 (1956). See
generally FREDxnIclc, op. cit. mrupra note 52, at 177; Gellman, The Regulation of
Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and
Analysis, 24 J. Am L. & Com. 410, 430-31 (1957).
60 Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1952). Exam-
ples of such hearings are found in Service to Trenton, 20 C.A.B. 290 (1955);
Portland-Seattle Serv., 17 C.A.B. 682, 685-86 (1953).
61 See Norfolk-Atlanta Nonstop Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 295, 298-99 (1955);
Continental Air Lines, Route Consolidation, 10 C.A.B. 657, 663-65, 669 (1949).
Compare United Restriction, 18 C.A.B. 17, 18-21 (1953) (dissenting opinion).
62 Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122270 (C.A.B. May 19,
1959) ; see Southeastern Area Local Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. 122342 (C.A.B. Dec.
18, 1959) ; Northeastern States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122341
(C.A.B. Dec. 15, 1959); Cleveland-New York Nonstop Serv., 21 C.A.B. 760, 764
(1955); Columbia-Florence Restriction, 21 C.A.B. 238, 239 (1955); Western Air
Lines Serv. to Sioux Falls, 20 C.A.B. 757, 780 (1955); Texas Local Serv., 18
C.A.B. 34, 37-38 (1953); Las Vegas-Los Angeles Restriction, 17 C.A.B. 23, 42
(1953); United Air Lines, Detroit-New York Nonstop, 7 C.A.B. 781 (1947);
North Cent., 7 C.A.B. 639, 649-51 (1946) ; American Airlines, Route Consolidations,
7 C.A.B. 337, 347 (1946) ; New England, 7 C.A.B. 27, 36 (1946).
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their shorter hops.' Here again, removal of the restrictions is occa-
sionally granted " and occasionally denied. 5
Other restrictions have been placed in certificates to protect the
feeder carriers from the competition of the trunk lines. Thus a trunk
line may be prohibited from stopping at both of two named points on
a given route; in the alternative, a stop may be allowed but on a
"closed door" basis whereby no passengers may be enplaned.66  From
time to time such restrictions have been found no longer necessary and
have been removed; 67 in other instances they have been retained."' As
one acute observer has commented on such restrictions, the CAB never
lets competitive factors override its protective function.6 9
With the growth of air transport and changes in technology, the
CAB has endeavored to shift some of the trunk lines' shorter hops to
the feeder carriers. The courts have sustained the Board's authority to
suspend the certificates of the trunk line carriers in order to accomplish
this end.7" Thus Northwest Airlines lost its authority to serve Kalis-
pell, Montana, and West Coast was substituted for it." In many
63 Caribbean Area, 9 C.A.B. 534, 548, 550-54 (1948).
64 States-Alaska, 20 C.A.B. 791, 804-06 (1955); Portland-Seattle Serv., 17
C.A.B. 682, 703-07 (1953); Through Serv. Investigation, 16 C.A.B. 6, 8-10 (1952).
65 Milwaukee-Chicago-New York Restriction, 11 C.A.B. 310, 332 (1950), reald
on other grounds sub non. Northwest Airlines v. CAB, 194 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir.
1952).
66See Columbia-Florence Restriction, 21 C.A.B. 238, 239 (1955); Additional
Serv. to the Va. Peninsula, 20 C.A.B. 273, 274, 287 (1955); Charleston-Columbus,
19 C.A.B. 731, 771 (1955); Southwest Renewal-United Suspension, 15 C.A.B. 61
(1952), aff'd sub nora. United Airlines v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952); Con-
tinental Airlines, Inc., 10 C.A.B. 657, 674 (1949); Caribbean Area, 9 C.A.B. 534,
538-40 (1948); Cincinnati-New York Additional Serv., 8 C.A.B. 152, 162 (1947);
Latin Am. Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 857, 881-82 (1946) ; Transcontinental & W. Airlines,
Inc., 4 C.A.B. 373 (1943) ; GrLL & BATs, op. cit. supra note 52, at 186-87. Compare
Charleston-Columbus, 19 C.A.B. 731, 735 (1955); Texas Local Serv., 18 C.A.B.
34, 49 (1953) ; Portland-Seattle Serv., 17 C.A.B. 682, 705 (1953). See Parks Inves-
tigation, 11 C.A.B. 779, 795-800 (1950) (dissenting opinion), aff'd sub nora. Con-
tinental So. Lines v. CAB, 197 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831
(1952). An air carrier may not stop more than forty-five minutes at any point
on its certificate unless the point is one of origin or termination. 14 C.F.R.
§ 202.6(a) (1956).
67 Columbia-Florence Restriction, 21 C.A.B. 238, 241 (1955); Tulsa, Wichita
Falls & Cent. Serv., 17 C.A.B. 1017, 1026 (1953) ; Las Vegas-Los Angeles Restriction,
17 C.A.B. 23, 25, 27 (1953); Trans-World Airlines, Restriction Removal Route
No. 2, 16 C.A.B. 265, 267, 269 (1952); West Coast, 6 C.A.B. 961, 968 (1946).
6 8Trans-Pac. Certificate Renewal, 20 C.A.B. 47, 64 (1955); Portland-Seattle
Serv., 17 C.A.B. 682, 685 (1953).
69 Keyes, National Policy Toward Commercial Aviation-Some Basic Problems,
16 J. Am L. & Com. 280, 295 (1949).
70 United Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100, 106-08 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Western
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 196 F.2d 933, 936 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 875
(1952).
71 Montana Local Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. 22296 (C.A.B. July 29, 1959) (sup-
plemental opinion); see Spokane-Calgary Route, Can., Route, IA Av. L. REP. 1 22367
(C.A.B. March 8, 1960); Southeastern Area Local Serv., IA Av. L. REP. 122342
(C.A.B. Dec. 18, 1959); Northeastern States Area Investigation, IA Av. L. REP.
122341 (C.A.B. Dec. 15, 1959); Pacific Northwest Local Serv., IA Av. L. REP.
122297 (C.A.B. July 30, 1959) (supplemental opinion) ; Ozark Certificate Renewal, 19
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instances, however, such changes involve increases in subsidies or
reduced service and the CAB has sometimes thought the price involved
too high for the probable results.72
Schedules
Although the CAB has comprehensive powers over the routes
which air carriers may follow, the organic statute contains a limitation
on its power over scheduling: "No term, condition, or limitation of
a certificate shall restrict the right of an air carrier to add to or change
schedules, equipment, accommodations, and facilities for performing
the authorized transportation and service as the development of the
business and the demands of the public shall require." 73
As we have seen, however, many certificates contain conditions
requiring carriers to make mandatory stops 7' and by indirection the
CAB appears to have achieved considerable control over scheduling.7"
The most important facet of CAB control of scheduling is found in
the controversy with respect to the "nonskeds." Such carriers, li-
censed not by certificate but by exemption, were strictly limited as to
number of flights in a manner which has given rise to extensive
debate.
76
C.A.B. 95 (1954); Service to Fayetteville, 19 C.A.B. 25 (1954); United Airlines,
Rock Springs Suspension, 18 C.A.B. 147, 157 (1953); North Cent. Route Investiga-
tion, 17 C.A.B. 106 (1953) ; Southwest Renewal-United Suspension, 15 C.A.B. 61, 72-
73 (1952), aff'd sub norn. United Airlines v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952). See
also KEYES, FEDERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION 249 (1951).
7 2 Trans-Tex. Segments 2 & 6 Renewal, 17 C.A.B. 257, 259, 278-79 (1953);
Southern Certificate Renewal, 17 C.A.B. 116, 196-97, 199-200, 203-04 (1953).
73 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e), 72 Stat. 755, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e)
(1958).
74 See note 58 mipra and accompanying text. There are numerous regulations
touching on scheduling. The CAB has prescribed procedures respecting applications
for change in service pattern, 14 C.F.R. § 202.4 (1956); has required that airlines
file their schedules with the CAB, 14 C.F.R. § 231.1 (1956) ; has prohibited "unrealis-
tic" scheduling by requiring that 75% of all scheduled flights be performed and
completed within fifteen minutes of scheduled time, 14 C.F.R. §§ 234.1(d), .3 (Supp.
1960) ; has directed that advertised schedules conform to those filed with the CAB,
14 C.F.R. § 234.5 (Supp. 1960); and has directed that supplemental air carriers
file flight reports, 14 C.F.R. § 242.2 (1956).
75 See Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 456 (1955); Through Serv. Inves-
tigation, 16 C.A.B. 6, 9 (1952); CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE PoLIcY 93-95 (1958).
Compare Note, Adequacy of Domestic Airline Service: The Community's Role in a
Changing Industry, 68 YALE L.J. 1199, 1206 (1959).
7 6 AIRLINES REPORT 81-82, 86. See generally id. at 74-110. See also GILL &
BATES, op. cit. supra note 52, at 186-87. The CAB may order through routes and
joint rates. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1002(i), 72 Stat. 790, 49 U.S.C. § 1482(i)
(1958) ; cf. New York-Houston Interchange, 16 C.A.B. 603 (1952) ; Southern Serv.
to the West, 12 C.A.B. 518, 535-38 (1951). Compare Panagra Terminal Investiga-
tion, 4 C.A.B. 670, 677-78 (1944) ; Pan Am. Matson-Inter-Island Contract, 3 C.A.B.
540, 546-47 (1942). Scheduling may have considerable impact upon load densities





The Federal Aviation Act specifically permits the Board to estab-
lish classifications of air carriers.7 7  As indicated above, some carriers
operate under certificates while others are merely exempted from the
requirements of the statute. In the certificated group, the most im-
portant commercially are the trunk lines of which some twelve are
now in operation.7 8  Among the trunk lines the four largest-the "Big
Four"--enjoy a large proportion of the total commercial traffic and
their costs may be lower than those of the smaller carriers.7" Mention
must also be made of the several foreign air carriers which provide
service in part competitive with that of the domestic airlines."0
Cargo
Unlike other forms of transport, air carriers have never found
that freight traffic constituted an important part of their business."'
As a consequence, the CAB, in awarding routes and imposing restric-
tions, speaks almost exclusively in terms of passenger traffic.8 " Never-
theless, freight--chiefly perishable products-has provided a not insig-
nificant fraction of airline revenues. 3 Both trunk lines and feeder
carriers haul mail and express as well as cargo."- Express, however,
has been somehow distinguished from freight, apparently in an effort
77Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §416(a), 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. § 1386(a)
(1958).
78 1956 CAB ANN. REP. 1. See BIGHAM & ROBERTS, TRANSPORTATIoN 114-15
(1952); WiLcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TowARD BUSINESS 638 (1955); AIRLINES REPORT
18-21. See New England, 7 C.A.B. 27, 39-40 (1946); Southern Serv. to the West,
19 C.A.B. 309, 312 (1954); Southwest Renewal-United Suspension, 15 C.A.B. 61,
72-73, aff'd sub nom. United Airlines v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952); Parks
Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 779, 792-93 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Continental So. Lines v.
CAB, 197 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952). All Am. Aviation
Pick-Up, Delivery Serv., 2 C.A.B. 133, 145-46 (1940). See also Maclay & Burt,
Entry of New Carriers into Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. AIR L. &
Com. 131, 154-55 (1955).
79 CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 75, at 42-43, 51; Koontz, supra note 52, at
133-40.
8 0 AIRPNEs REPORT 236-64.
81 WILcox, op. cit. supra note 78, at 638.
82 Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 456 (1955); Norfolk-Atlanta Nonstop
Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 295 (1955).
83 Cf. BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 78, at 145.
84 Considerable controversy has arisen out of CAB actions permitting or not
permitting various classes of carriers to handle mail, freight, and express. The
CAB allowed the cargo carriers to haul surface mail by air during a post office
experiment and its action-though contested by the trunk lines-was approved by
the courts. Surface-Mail-by-Air Exemptions, 20 C.A.B. 658 (1955), aff'd sub nont.
American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1956). See generally
Durham & Feldstein, supra note 48, at 775; Gambrell & Moye, Position of the
Certificated Air Carriers in Civil Aeronautics Board Freight Proceedings, 15 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 6, 7, 9, 10 (1950); Wilson, Air Freight and Air Express, 15
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 37, 42 (1950).
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to shelter freight forwarders from the competition of the Railway
Express Agency, which has long dominated the air express business.8 5
Considerable controversy has arisen with respect to CAB han-
dling of applications for all-cargo certificates. Ultimately and some-
what reluctantly, the Board has granted such certificates on the theory
that the other certificated carriers would not lose much traffic to the
all-cargo operators."8 Even though the all-cargo carriers receive no
subsidy payments, the CAB was hesitant to let them carry express and
only recently has allowed them to haul mail on an experimental basis.8
Such protection of the trunk and feeder lines has given rise to a sub-
stantial amount of adverse comment, particularly by those who claim
that the passenger lines have neglected the freight business and that
specialized carriers are necessary to develop it fully.8
Feeder Lines
Those certificated carriers which do not fall within the category
of trunk lines are referred to as feeder, local, or regional air carriers. 9
85 See Air Freight Forwarder, 9 C.A.B. 473, 487-88 (1948) ; Gambrell & Moye,
supra note 84, at 5; Wilson, supra note 84, at 40-44.
86 Trans-Atl. Cargo, 21 C.A.B. 671, 679, 682 (1954); Additional Serv. to
Puerto Rico, 12 C.A.B. 430, 490-91 (1951); Air Freight, 10 C.A.B. 572, 588-90
(1949). The CAB, however, may not grant an exception to carry mail across the
Atlantic based only on a finding that the applicant is in financial distress. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 912 (1959). See generally Ailes, The Position of the Freight Carriers
Before the Civil Aeronautics Board, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 17 (1950) ; BIGHAM
& ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 78, at 153-54, 627; KEYEs, op. cit. supra note 71,
at 211-16.
8 7American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 231 F.2d 483, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The
CAB has always expressed fears lest duplicate services result in "uneconomical"
competition; it has forbidden the cargo carriers to render passenger services even
on a charter basis. Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. CAB, 204 F.2d 404, 406 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Air Freight, 10 C.A.B. 572, 592 (1949), aff'd, 192 F.2d 417 (1951). Only
after the more important certificated airlines had gone off subsidy did the CAB
grant authority to the cargo carriers to include express shipments and mail on an
experimental basis. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 247 F.2d 327, 330-31 (5th Cir.
1957). Thus, it is apparent that the CAB has been cautiously permitting competi-
tion to creep in as the certificated lines gain financial strength and stability. Compare
City of Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d 741, 754 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Coyle Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 115 F. Supp. 272, 278 (E.D. La. 1953); Pacific No. Airlines, Inc. v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 592, 601 (D. Alaska 1948) ; Texas E. Transmission
Corp., 19 P.U.R.3d 76, 88-89, 93, 97-98 (FPC 1957).
88 Ailes, supra note 86, at 19-20, 28; see Durham & Feldstein, supra note 48,
at 786-87, 792, 802.
89 See Continental-Pioneer Acquisition, 20 C.A.B. 323, 330-31 (1955); Parks
Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 779, 791-92 (1950), aff'd sub nom. Continental So. Lines v.
CAB, 197 F.2d 397 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952); Florida Case, 6
C.A.B. 765, 785-86 (1946), aff'd, 197 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831
(1952) ; Investigation of Local, Feeder & Pick-Up Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 1 (1944) ; All
Am. Aviation, Pick-Up, Delivery Serv., 2 C.A.B. 133, 139 (1940). See text accom-
panying notes 70-72 supra for a discussion of the routes of the feeder lines and their
enlargement by a shift from trunk line to feeder service. The status of the feeders is
discussed in AnRLINEs REPORT 23-24; Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in;
United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 25 J.
Am L. & CoM. 148, 180 (1958) ; Taaffe, A Map Analysis of United States Airline
Competition, 25 J. Am L. & Coar. 121, 125-29, 132-36 (1958).
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The feeder airlines are designed primarily for shorter hops 90 and it
follows both that they offer fewer attractions to passengers and ship-
pers and that they incur higher relative costs. 1 Most of the trunk
lines now operate without subsidy while the opposite is true of the
feeder carriers. Furthermore, the effort to render the trunk lines self-
supporting has made it expedient to impose restrictions upon the feeder
carriers so as to reduce the competition they might otherwise offer
the long distance lines."2 At the same time the CAB has taken some
action looking to the sheltering of the feeder lines from the competition
of trunk carriers.93
Nonscheduled Carriers
While the CAB has engaged in many controversial activities, few
have inspired so much discussion as its treatment of the "nonskeds."
Such carriers were originally refused certificates by the Board, but
from time to time and in varying degrees they were permitted to operate
under the Board's exemption power.94 But that power, the courts
have made clear, is not unlimited:
Despite the broad language of Section 416(b) we think it is
perfectly clear that the Congress did not set up so elaborate a
series of provisions in respect to the certification of carriers, and
the public interest, convenience and necessity therein involved,
and at the same time grant its administrative agency power to
destroy those elaborate provisions. We think there is and must
be a boundary to the authority of the Board under its exemption
power to impinge upon the certificated service. 95
90See Charleston-Columbus, 19 C.A.B. 731 (1955); Klamath Falls-Medford
Serv., 17 C.A.B. 713, 716-17 (1953).
91 See Trans-Tex. Certificate Renewal, 12 C.A.B. 606, 633-34 (1951) (dissent-
ing opinion) ; Arizona-Monarch Merger, 11 C.A.B. 246, 254-56 (1950) ; CErIMNGToN,
op. cit. wtpra note 75, at 53-63; Koontz, supra note 52, at 140.92 Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 1A Av. L. REP. 22287
(C.A.B. June 24, 1959) ; Service to Trenton, 20 C.A.B. 290, 291-92 (1955) ; Service
to Fayetteville, 19 C.A.B. 25, 26 (1954); Southwest-W. Coast Merger, 14 C.A.B.
356, 357-58 (1951). But see Gellman, supra note 59, at 422, 424-26. Compare Ozark
Certificate Renewal, 19 C.A.B. 95, 105, 108-09 (1954) (separate opinion); Pioneer
Air Lines, Inc., Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 499, 513 (1953).
93 Cf. Southwest Renewal-United Suspension, 15 C.A.B. 61, 72-73, af'd, 198
F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952); Trans-Tex. Certificate Renewal, 12 C.A.B. 606, 617
(1951).
94 Such power is vested in the CAB by the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§416(b) (1), 72 Stat. 771, 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b) (1958).
95 American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 905 (1957). In order to grant an exemption the CAB must make
an express finding that certification would involve an undue burden, and would not
be in the public interest. A mere finding that the applicant's financial situation is
acute and that its existence is in jeopardy is not sufficient to support the grant of
an exemption. Pan Am. World Airways v. CAB, 261 F.2d 754, 757 (D.C. Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 912 (1959). Compare applications of various air carriers
to carry first class mail in Mail Transp. by Noncertified Carriers, 18 C.A.B. 201,
205-06 (1953) ; American Airlines, Route Consolidation, 7 C.A.B. 337, 348-49 (1946).
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We need not review the history of the "nonskeds" in detail. When
regulation commenced in 1938, the CAB granted them a blanket exemp-
tion for operations not involving the transportation of passengers for
hire. 6  In 1946 the CAB investigated such carriers and determined
that no major changes in the scope of the exemptions were required."
In 1948 the "nonskeds"-also referred to as "irregular carriers"-
sought extension of their exemptions to permit scheduled operations
at low coach fares. Such an extension was denied by the Board,9"
and in 1949 it withdrew the blanket exemption and required registra-
tion by the "nonskeds." 99 It was found that the route-type operations
which they were conducting lay outside the scope of the exemption
and caused an unwarranted diversion of traffic from certificated car-
riers; hence the CAB tightened the exemptions and sought to ensure
that only truly irregular service was offered to the public.1"' In addi-
tion to being required to register, "nonskeds" were forbidden to
attempt to provide regular service to the public by coordinating their
flights through a joint ticket agent.1° Collaboration of the "nonskeds"
in pooling their services through the joint ticket agent device was
resisted by the CAB, which revoked letters of registration where it
found that irregular carriers had joined together to furnish what
amounted to regularly scheduled flights.' The question remained,
however, as to whether judicial relief was available against "nonskeds"
which overstepped the bounds of their contingent exemptions. 03
96 See Netterville, The Regulation of Irregular Air Carriers, 16 J. AIR L. & CoM.
414, 415-17 (1949). See generally Moore & Hahn, Regulation of Irregular Air
Carriers, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 48, 49 (1949).
9 7 Investigation of Nonscheduled Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 1049 (1946).
98 Standard Airlines, Exemption Request, 9 C.A.B. 583 (1948).
99 14 C.F.R. §§ 291.2, .17 (1956). See Moore & Hahn, supra note 96, at 56-64.
The most recent report of denial of a request for an individual exemption is Irregular
Air Carrier Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122316 (C.A.B. Oct. 12, 1959).
100 Large Irregular Carriers, Exemptions, 11 C.A.B. 609, 616-21 (1950). See
AIRLINES REPORT 28-29, 81. See generally Netterville, supra note 96, at 419-23.
Compare Pacific W., Irregular Canada-United States Serv., 19 C.A.B. 270 (1954);
Bristol Bay Area Bush Proceeding, 17 C.A.B. 1121, 1148 (1953). The related con-
tract carrier problem is touched upon in Moore & Hahn, supra note 96, at 46-68.
101 See 14 C.F.R. § 291(8) (1956) (examples of irregular air transportation).
102 See North Am. Airlines v. CAB, 240 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 941 (1957); Air Transp. Associates, Inc. v. CAB, 199 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 922 (1953).
103 See Great Lakes Airlines, Inc., Enforcement, IA Av. L. Rxr. 22311 (C.A.B.
Sept. 28, 1959); 20th Century Air Lines, Compliance Proceeding, 21 C.A.B. 133
(1955) ; American Air Transp., Revocation Proceeding, 16 C.A.B. 294, 300-03
(1952) ; Standard Air Lines, Noncertificated Operations, 10 C.A.B. 486, 501-02
(1949) ; Trans-Marine Airlines, Inc., Investigation, 6 C.A.B. 1071 (1946); Page
Airways, Inc., Investigation, 6 C.A.B. 1016 (1946); Moore & Hahn, .mipra note 96,
at 56. Compare Keyes, supra note 69, at 295. Compare Airline Reservations, En-
forcement Proceeding, 18 C.A.B. 114, 115 (1953), where sale of "exchange orders"
which looked like tickets but did not evidence an obligation on the part of the carrier
to furnish transportation was held to constitute an unfair and deceptive practice; the




In 1956 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
before the CAB could exempt an irregular carrier from the require-
ment of certification, the Board must comply with the statute by find-
ing that the requirement of certification would impose an undue burden
on the carrier-either by reason of the carrier's limited operations or
because of other unusual circumstances-and that requiring certifica-
tion would not be in the public interest.'"° Moreover, the findings of
the Board must be stated in sufficient detail for a court to review them
and not merely in the conclusory language of the statute.0 5 The prac-
tical effect of this decision was presumably to deny exemption to the
irregular carriers.
Later the CAB embarked on a program of certificating the
irregular carriers'0 6 but sought to retain their "irregular" character
by not designating specific termini in the certificate and by limiting
therein the number of flights conducted in any month in the same
direction between the same two points. But again the CAB's
scheme was thwarted by the District of Columbia court, this time on
the ground that such certification was extrastatutory. 10 The net re-
sult of the two decisions was seemingly that "nonskeds" could be
neither certificated nor exempted. Affairs were in this sorry admin-
istrative-judicial imbroglio when Congress authorized the CAB to
validate for twenty months temporary certificates issued pursuant to
its earlier executive orders.'
Whatever the merits of the controversy, the CAB has long been
the target of those who believe that the nonscheduled carriers should
have been fostered rather than repressed. 9 Obviously, the Board
has been sheltering the certificated trunk and feeder lines from non-
scheduled competition. 10 Some commentators take the view that the
"nonskeds" were the innovators who made low-cost "coach" service
104American Airlines v. CAB, 235 F.2d 845 (1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 905
(1957).
105 235 F.2d at 851-52.
106 See Large Irregular Air Carrier Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP. [ 22247
(C.A.B. Jan. 28, 1959).
107 United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 278 F.2d 448 (D.C. Cir. 1960). The statute
provides that each certificate specify terminal and intermediate points and that no
certificate may limit the right of an air carrier to add to or change schedules. Federal
Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(e), 72 Stat.755, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(e) (1958).
108 Act of July 14, 1960, 74 Stat. 527.
109 "[Tjhe Board has looked upon the irregular group of carriers as poachers
who have frequently skimmed the cream off the top of the air transportation market."
Gellman, supra note 89, at 163.
110 See CAB v. Modern Air Transp., Inc., 179 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1950) ; Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc. v. Standard Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
AIRnLNEs REPORT 83. See generally Netterville, supra note 96, at 432.
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available to the public and therefore deserved better treatment than
they received.'
Other Categories
By official classification there has been recognized the category
of "air taxi operators," 12 whose operations are not tremendously
important in the overall air carrier picture. The CAB has also recog-
nized the class of air freight forwarders-these being indirect carriers
who may ship only via common air carriers."' In licensing the for-
warders on an experimental basis, the Board noted that their activities
might exert some downward pressure upon the rates of certificated
carriers and indicated that it would prevent any drop in rates from
reaching ruinous levels. 14
COMBINATIONS OF AIR CARRIERS
Transfer of Certificates
No certificate issued by the CAB may be transferred without the
approval of the Board." 5 The CAB has moved cautiously in consider-
ing transfers," 6 disapproving or restricting those which might en-
danger the continuance of service.
1 7
Mergers
Air carrier mergers must be approved by the CAB 118 and the
Board is directed by statute not to approve those which would result
I1 See CHERINGTON, op. cit. mpra note 75, at 189-90; FREDERICK, COMMERCIAL
AIR TRANSPORTATION 218 (1955) ; Wimcox, op. cit. wtpra note 78, at 641-42; AIRLINES
REPORT 82-83, 87-94, 268-70; Note, Public Regulation of Domestic Airlines, 60 YALE
L.J. 1196, 1197-99 (1951). But see Transcontinental Coach-Type Serv., 14 C.A.B.
720 (1951) ; Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Among Domestic Trunk Airlines,
20 J. Am L. & Com. 379, 384-85, 387, 396, 402 (1953).
112 14 C.F.R. §298 (1956). Compare Transatlantic Charter Policy, 1955, 20
C.A.B. 782 (1955); Cariboo Air Charter, Irregular Canada-United States Serv., 19
C.A.B. 671 (1954).
"1
3 See 14 C.F.R. § 296 (1956).
14 See Air Freight Forwarder, 9 C.A.B. 473, 493-94, 496, 503 (1948), aff'd
sub nom. American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1949), Nat'! Air
Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952). As to the nature
of a forwarder, see Consolidated Flour Shipments, Inc. v. CAB, 213 F.2d 814 (9th
Cir. 1954), affirming 17 C.A.B. 45 (1953). Note the protectionism in Air Freight
Forwarder Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 546 (1955) (forwarder status denied to
joint venture of certificated lines), and Air Freight Forwarder (International), 11
C.A.B. 182, 192-93 (1949) (restrictions to prevent destructive competition).
115 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(h), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(h)
(1958).
116 E.g., United-W. Acquisition Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298, 306 (1947).
17 E.g., Parks Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 779, 785 (1950), aff'd, 197 F.2d 397
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952) ; cf. Bonanza-TWA, Route Authoriza-
tion Transfer, 10 C.A.B. 893, 895-96 (1949).
11 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §408(a), 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)
(1958) ; cf. Powelson v. National Airlines, Inc., 220 Miss. 595, 71 So. 2d 467 (1954).
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in monopoly.1 9 Whatever effect may be given to the congressional
directive as to monopoly, CAB approval renders the transaction exempt
from the antitrust laws.
120
Mergers have been approved by the Board when it appeared likely
that costs could be reduced.'2 Large subsidy payments have made
opportunities to reduce operational losses attractive, even though the
evidence as to overall economies of scale in the industry is conflicting.
122
A promise of improved service also has proven appealing to the
CAB. 23 In granting approval the Board is likely to note that the
proposed merger will not divert a substantial amount of traffic from
other lines-that is, that the merger will have low competitive im-
pact.124  Occasionally, however, the Board will explicitly note that
competition will not be seriously impaired.'25 It is worth remarking
3lO Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §408(b), 72 Stat 767, 49 U.S.C. §1378(b)
(1958). Compare Minneapolis & S.L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959).
See generally KEYES, op. cit. supra note 71, at 72-80; 1 CAA ANN. REP,. 17, 23-24
(1939). It is difficult to understand why the CAB is also charged with responsi-
bility for enforcing § 7 of the Clayton Act, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1958). See Levi, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Regulated Industries,
in N.Y. ST. BAR Ass'N SYmPosium 136, 137 (1959). The language of the latter
legislation, however, apparently exempts stock acquisitions from its terms. Id. at
138. As to the formation of the joint subsidiary under the Federal Aviation Act,
see 20th Century Airlines, Compliance Proceeding, 21 C.A.B. 133, 143 (1955).
120 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958);
Levi, supra note 119, at 137. Cf. United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) ; State
Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114 N.E. 191 (1916).
121 E.., Continental-Pioneer Acquisition, 20 C.A.B. 323 (1955); Eastern-Nat'l-
Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B. 781 (1954); Flying Tiger-Slick Merger,
18 C.A.B. 326, 343 (1954); Delta-Chicago & So. Merger, 16 C.A.B. 647 (1952);
Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger, 15 C.A.B. 708 (1952); West Coast-Empire Merger,
15 C.A.B. 971, 972-73 (1952).
122 See CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 75, at 42-44; GILL & BATws, ARLinE
COMPETITOiN 417-18 (1949); Healy, Workable Competition in Air Transportation,
35 PROCEEDINGS Am. EcoN. Ass'N 229, 240-41 (1945); Koontz, Economic and
Managerial Factors Underlying Subsidy Needs of Domestic Trunk Line Carriers,
18 J. Ani L. & Comt. 127, 133-40, 152-56 (1951). Air mail rates are now equal for
all the lines so that this element of cost coverage does not vary. See Domestic
Trunklines, Service Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 8, 41-43 (1955) ; Gellman, supra note 89,
at 153-54. In some instances, it appears that the CAB has gone so far as to push
airlines into mergers. E.g., Eastern-Nat'l-Colonial, Acquisition of Assets, 18 C.A.B.
781 (1954).
123 E.g., Continental-Pioneer Acquisition, 20 C.A.B. 323, 326 (1955); Arizona-
Monarch Merger, 11 C.A.B. 246, 247-48 (1950). The CAB has been known to
exhibit concern with respect to the purchase price paid by the acquiring carrier.
Apparently the Board is afraid to recognize the value of the certificate issued to
the acquired airline and also fearful that good will might be written into the rate
base of the acquiring firm. See Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 409,
411-16 (1940). See also United-W. Acquisition Air Carrier Property, 8 C.A.B. 298,
311-16 (1947).
124E.g., Flying Tiger-Slick Merger, 18 C.A.B. 326, 342-43 (1954); Delta-
Chicago & So. Merger, 16 C.A.B. 647, 648-49 (1952); West Coast-Empire Merger,
15 C.A.B. 971, 990-91 (1952); Braniff-Mid-Continent Merger, 15 C.A.B. 708, 730-31
(1952).
125 E.g., Transocean-Atlas, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122300, 22300.01-.02 (C.A.B.
Aug. 21, 1959); West Coast-Empire Merger, 15 C.A.B. 971, 992 (1952); Braniff-
Mid-Continent Merger, 15 C.A.B. 708, 735 (1952). See also KEYEs, FEDERAL
CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AI TRANSPORTATION 259 (1951); cf. Collins, Webb-
Pomerene v. Foreign Economic Policy, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 1195, 1205-06 (1951).
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that over the years the CAB has approved mergers which have been
responsible in large part for the creation of the present trunk line
structure.
Disapproval of a merger has followed a CAB finding of likely
substantial impact upon rival carriers; indeed, the CAB hestitates to
approve a union whereby the resulting carrier will enjoy an advantage
attributable to its size.1
6
The Board has also refused to allow mergers which would change
the classification of the carriers: two feeder lines, for example, may not
merge on an end-to-end basis whereby the successor would become
an additional trunk line carrier.'2 7 Note that here the action of the
Board is protectionist in character: the existing trunk lines are to be
sheltered from new competition. CAB action, however, has not de-
volved into a consistent pattern.
1 2
1
Interlocking directorships are forbidden by the express and com-
plex terms of the Federal Aviation Act.uD The CAB has taken a
broad view of the prohibition, applying it in such a manner as to
prevent a partnership as well as a natural person from holding seats
on the boards of two air carriers."' Oddly enough, the CAB is also
directed to enforce the less rigorous prohibitions contained in section
8 of the Clayton Act.1"1
Contracts Between Carriers
A specific statutory provision requires the submission for CAB
approval of all agreements between air carriers relating to service,
126 E.g., American Airlines, Control of Mid-Continent Air., 7 C.A.B. 365, 378-81
(1946). See also AIRLINES REPORT 254-56; 2 CAA ANN. REP. 9 (1940); Gellman,
supra note 89, at 167-68.
127 North Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 265 F.2d 581, 583-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959) ; Southwest-W. Coast Merger, 14 C.A.B. 356 (1951).
12 8 Gellman, supra note 89, at 171-73. Healy, supra note 122, at 237. Compare
Levi, supra note 119, at 144-45. See generally FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 111,
at 223-24. The CAB enjoys and exercises extensive powers to protect employees
from the adverse impact of a merger or transfer of certificate. Kent v. CAB, 204
F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 826 (1953); Western Air Lines v.
CAB, 194 F.2d 211, 213-14 (9th Cir. 1952); Kahn, Regulatory Agencies and
Industrial Relations: The Airlines Case, 42 PROCEFDINGS Am. Ecox. Ass'N 686,
689, 691, 693 (1952). Note the minimum pay requirement for pilot and co-pilot con-
tamined in Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(k), 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(k)(1958).129 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 409(a), 72 Stat. 768, 49 U.S.C. § 1379 (a)
(1958). Note that each air carrier must annually disclose to the CAB its roster of
shareholders holding 5% or more of its capital stock. Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
§ 407(b), 72 Stat. 766, 49 U.S.C. § 1377(b) (1958).
130 Lehman Bros. Interlocking Relationships, 15 C.A.B. 656, 658-60 (1952), aft'd,
209 F.2d 289, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 916 (1954). But see
Eastern-Colonial Control, 20 C.A.B. 629, 641-50 (1955) (mere ownership of stock
by shareholder or employee of another airline does not establish unlawful control).
131 Clayton Act § 8, 38 Stat. 732 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 19 (1958).
The provision charging the CAB with enforcement of § 8 is Clayton Act § 11, as




equipment, rates, schedules, and many other topics. If approved, such
contracts are exempted from the antitrust laws.132
A common form of agreement between carriers involves inter-
change of equipment for through service.'33 If it does not appear that
the effect of the contract will be "diversionary"-that is, likely to
divert traffic from some third airline-the CAB is apt to approve.3 4
Diversion may, of course, result because the third airline will no longer
interchange passengers with the parties to the agreement along the
route involved. On the other hand, where the CAB finds that the
agreement will result in undue diversion of traffic, disapproval will
follow-almost any arrangement calculated to gain a competitive ad-
vantage over a third party will be found adverse to the public interest.""
Approval of a through service agreement may result in varied effects
upon competition: potential competition between the parties is elim-
inated but more vigorous competition may be offered to other air-
lines.'3 6
Agreements establishing joint sales staffs have, with limitations,
sometimes been approved by the CAB. 3' Similarly, after effecting
some changes in the form of contract, the CAB has approved arrange-
132 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1958)
(formerly Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, ch. 601, § 414, 52 Stat. 1004). See Putnam v.
Air Transp. Ass'n, 112 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); AnINES REPORT 187;
1942 CAB ANN. REP. 29; Kahn, mpra note 128, at 693; Levi, supra note 119, at 138.
13 Note that by virtue of § 404(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72
Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a) (1958), an air carrier is under a duty to furnish rea-
sonable through service in connection with other air carriers.
134 Northwest-E. Equip. Interchange, 19 C.A.B. 346, 355-56 (1954); Southern
Serv. to the West, 18 C.A.B. 234, 239 (1953); Continental-United Equip. Inter-
change, 17 C.A.B. 635, 654-57 (1953); Braniff-United Equip. Interchange, 17
C.A.B. 618, 631-33 (1953); New York-Houston Interchange, 16 C.A.B. 603, 630-31
(1952); Capital-Nat'l Equip. Interchange, 10 C.A.B. 231, 243-44 (1949); American
Airlines Route Consolidation, 7 C.A.B. 337, 340-41 (1946). But see Through Serv.
Investigation, 16 C.A.B. 6, 36-37 (1952).
13 New York-Balboa Through Serv., Reopened, 20 C.A.B. 493, 498-500, 501,
504-05, 512 (1954); Southern Serv. to the West, 18 C.A.B. 234, 237-39, 282-86
(1953).
136 Southern Serv. to the West, 12 C.A.B. 518, 535, 548-49 (1951), reopened,
18 C.A.B. 790, 796-99 (1954), reopened, 19 C.A.B. 309, 310 (1954). A description
of the interchange activity together with a list of approved agreements and their
contents will be found in Keefer, Airline Interchange Agreements, 25 J. AIR L. &
Com. 55 (1958). The author concludes that the CAB has usually approved inter-
change of planes despite protests of other carriers to the effect that traffic diversion
would result. Id. at 65. Accord, Gellman, supra note 89, at 174-75; see Netterville,
supra note 96, at 429-31. Interchange agreements, of course, affect the award of
competitive routes. See Note, Public Regulation of Domestic Airlines: A Proposal
for Structural and Policy Reform, 60 YAL L.J. 1196, 1210-11 (1951).
'37 Independent Airlines Ass'n Commercial Charter Exchange, 1A Av. L. REP.
22331 (C.A.B. Nov. 12, 1959); Northwest Airlines, Inc., IA Av. L. REP. 22301
(C.A.B. Aug. 28, 1959); 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 29. Note the dissimilar result
reached in Volumair-Agreement C.A.B. 13204, 1A Av. L. REP. 22370 (C.A.B.
Aug. 6, 1960).
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ments with respect to the joint selection and recognition of travel
agents.
1 38
COMBINING MODES OF CARRIAGE
Statutory Provisions
In language reminiscent of the Interstate Commerce Act but more
sweeping in its prohibitions, the Federal Aviation Act seeks to assure
the independence of the airlines from other forms of transport. 3 9
While the CAB is empowered to approve combinations between dif-
ferent methods of transportation, 40 approval is rarely forthcoming.
In this respect, CAB action is analogous to that of the Interstate
Commerce Commission, which has substantially precluded railroad
entry into motor carriage.141
Steamship Operators
In many instances economies may be achieved by affiliation of air
and water carriers. Sales of tickets in joint offices, for example, may
combine efficiency with convenience to the patron. In a few cases, such
advantages have led the CAB to approve affiliation.' More fre-
quently, however, the CAB has disapproved. In some instances it has
expressed fears that established steamship operators might stifle the
growth of air transport to benefit their more traditional mode of car-
riage.'43 In other instances the CAB has voiced apprehension lest the
combined resources of air and surface carriers prove unduly weighty
to competitive air operations: that is, that steamship financing would
.38ATC Agency Resolution Investigation, IA Av. L. Rn,. 122282 (C.A.B.
June 10, 1959). Recently six major air carriers entered into an agreement providing
for mutual aid in the event of strikes. Those not subject to the strike are to turn
over their increased revenues less costs to the carrier burdened with the labor diffi-
culty. The CAB approved the agreement after deleting a term whereby the struck
carrier agreed to divert traffic solely to the other signatories to the agreement. Six
Carrier Mutual Aid Pact, 1A Av. L. REP. 22269 (C.A.B. May 20, 1959).
'39Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§408(a), (b), 72 Stat 767, 49 U.S.C.
§§1378(a), (b) (1958).
140 The powers of the CAB have been broadly interpreted by the courts. See
Continental So. Lines v. CAB, 197 F.2d 397, 400 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 831 (1952); Pan Am. Airways Co. v. CAB, 121 F.2d 810, 816 (2d Cir. 1941).
141 American President Lines Petition, 7 C.A.B. 799, 804-07 (1947); ef. Fulda,
Rail-Motor Competition: Motor-Carrier Operations by Railroads, 54 Nw. U.L. REv.
156 (1959).
142 Northwest Airlines-Am. President Lines Agreement, 9 C.A.B. 336, 338
(1948) ; American President Lines Petition, 7 C.A.B. 799, 801, 804 (1947): cf.
Baggett, Are Surface Carriers Grounded by Law?, 31 VA. L. REv. 337, 342 (1945).
143 Pan Am. Airways-United States Lines Agreement, 8 C.A.B. 609, 613-15
(1947), aff'd, 165 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1948); Pan Am.-Matson-Inter-Island Contract,
3 C.A.B. 540, 546-48 (1942) ; 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 28, 30.
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build air carriage up to a level of service which rival firms operating
only in air carriage could not achieve.
144
Railroads
The CAB has long permitted the railroad-owned Railway Express
Agency to conduct an indirect air carriage traffic (air express) ; and in
some instances rail subsidiaries have been allowed to act as for-
warders of air freight.145 Obvious economies are involved in ware-
housing, local delivery, and record-keeping when a freight forwarder
is allowed to offer air as well as rail service. For that very reason,
however, the CAB has often denied entry into the air field to railroad-
affiliated forwarders. Such firms would have a competitive advantage
over forwarders offering only air service. Fears have also been ex-
pressed that heavy investment in established railroad facilities would
lead affiliated forwarders to divert traffic away from the airlines. 4 '
Motor Carriers
For reasons far from clear, similar fears have not been apparent
with respect to motor carrier affiliation. In most instances, the
CAB-finding economies and service benefits in air and motor affilia-
tion-has approved such arrangements. 47
Independent Forwarders
Surface carrier forwarders who are not affiliated with a railroad
or other direct carrier have generally been granted entry into the air
1"Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83, 107-08 (1946); Pan Am.-Matson-Inter-Island
Contract, 3 C.A.B. 540, 547 (1942); Hickey, Surface Carrier Participation in Air
Transportation, 36 GEo. L.J. 125, 139 (1948). Compare United States v. Inter-
Island Steam Nay. Co., 87 F. Supp. 1010, 1018-19 (D. Hawaii 1950); Hawaiian
Airlines, Ltd. v. Trans-Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D. Hawaii 1948);
Trans-Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 21 C.A.B. 253, 255 (1955); American President Lines
Petition, 7 C.A.B. 799 (1947); Latin Am. Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 857, 905-07 (1946);
Northeast Airlines, Inc., 6 C.A.B. 319, 341-42 (1945); Lake Line Application Under
Panama Canal Act, 33 I.C.C. 700 (1915).
145 Compare National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384,
389 (D.C. Cir. 1952), with id. at 392 (dissenting opinion). See Air Freight Forwarder
Investigation, 21 C.A.B. 536, 545 (1955) ; Air Freight Forwarder, 11 C.A.B. 182, 197
(1949).
146 National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384, 387-88 (D.C.
Cir. 1952); American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 178 F.2d 903, 909 (7th Cir. 1949);
Air Freight Forwarder, 9 C.A.B. 473, 485, 509-11 (1948); KEYEs, op. cit. s11pra
note 125, at 225-26. Compare American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. Frisco Transp. Co.,
358 U.S. 133 (1958) ; Railroad Control of Northeast Airlines, 4 C.A.B. 379, 381-82,
385-86 (1943) ; Railway Express Agreements, 4 C.A.B. 157 (1943).
147 Consolidated Air Freight, Interlocking Relationships, 20 C.A.B. 740 (1955);
Braungart, Interlocking Relationships, 19 C.A.B. 456, 461 (1954); Gilbert Air
Transp., Interlocking Relationship, 17 C.A.B. 558 (1953) ; Great Lakes Area, 8 C.A.B.
360, 403-05 (1947). Note the contrary result in Southeastern Area Local Serv.,
1A Av. L. REP. ff 22342.03 (C.A.B. Dec. 18, 1959). Compare Parks Investigation,
11 C.A.B. 779, 787, 789 (1950), aff'd, 197 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344
U.S. 831 (1952).
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transport field. The CAB, in approving affiliation, has pointed out
that such forwarders have no substantial investment in surface carriage
facilities; therefore, the CAB reasons, they will not be tempted to
divert traffic from air transport.148
A policy whereby operators of railroads, steamship lines, and
other forms of surface transport are denied entry into aviation trans-
port imposes additional costs upon patrons, and perhaps upon tax-
payers.149  It constitutes still another device whereby certificated air-
lines are sheltered from vigorous competition. Like a protective
tariff, it is designed to soften the cradle of an "infant industry." Such
a policy cannot be reconciled with the theory of "hard" competition
which many observers find in the Sherman Act.
Affiliation with Suppliers
In parallel fashion, legislation has long prohibited the affiliation--
without CAB approval-of airlines and persons otherwise engaged
in aeronautics.' Perhaps to prevent the "unloading" of planes upon
subsidized carriers, aircraft manufacturers were apparently the prin-
cipal targets of such prohibitions. The CAB has carefully scrutinized
such situations, sometimes approving common control on the condition
148 Republic Air Freight, Interlocking Relationships, 18 C.A.B. 643, 646 (1954) ;
Empire Shipping, Interlocking Relationships, 18 C.A.B. 485 (1954); Pacific Air
Freight, Interlocking Relationship, 17 C.A.B. 561 (1953); Air Freight Forwarder,
11 C.A.B. 182, 198-99 (1949). In some of the cases the CAB has taken the position
that other freight forwarders are so numerous that competition would suffice to
prevent the "diversion" about which it is so concerned. That reasoning, however,
is equally applicable to the case of the rail-affiliated forwarder whose entry the CAB
has so often blocked. Compare Air Freight Forwarder, 9 C.A.B. 473, 502-03, 511-12
(1948); Local, Feeder, & Pick-up Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 1, 7-8 (1944).
149 See Nelson, Effects of Public Regulation on Railroad Performance, 50 PRO-
CEEDINGs Am. EcoN. Ass'N 495, 504 (1960). There is a popular misconception to
the effect that a firm which has invested in a given machine will not replace it with
a new type of device until it is worn out, unless compelled to do so by competition
or otherwise. Economists take a different view of the problem. The amount of
investment in the old machine is irrelevant. The orthodox view is that the entrepre-
neur should consider only the additional profit which he can obtain by purchasing and
installing the new machine. In other words, the new device should be installed if its
total costs are less than the operating costs of the existing machine. LuTz & LuTz,
THE THEORY OF INVESTMENT OF THE FIRM 113-14 (1951). In the reports of the
CAB itself there appears considerable evidence to the effect that operators of steam-
ships have fostered the development of air transportation. E.g., Trans-Pac. Certificate
Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 253, 254, 264 (1955). It is also apparent that the Railway Express
Agency, owned by proprietors of railroads, has vigorously promoted air express service.
Cf. National Air Freight Forwarding Corp. v. CAB, 197 F.2d 384, 390 (D.C. Cir.
1952), affirming 9 C.A.B. 473, 485 (1948). Nonetheless, observers continue to argue
that surface carriers would be under a strong incentive to protect their existing
investment in surface transportation. E.g., Hickey, supra note 144, at 143. See
generally FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 111, at 188-89. Compare Baggett, mtpra
note 142, at 347.
150 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 408-09, 72 Stat. 767, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1378-79




that there be no dealings between the firms. 5' The statutory pro-
hibitions extend to diversification upon the part of air carriers. Thus
a certificate as an air carrier could be granted the proprietor of a flying
school only upon a CAB finding that the combination would not be
deleterious to public service. 152  Here again, the policy is inconsistent
with that applied in the free sector of the economy, where cash sub-
sidies are not paid and rates not fixed.' 3
FINANCE
Payment of Subsidies
Air transport is one of the few regulated industries to receive cash
subsidies. Subsidies were long paid as part of the airlines' compensa-
tion for carriage of mail.' In recent years, however, payments have
been clearly divided into "service" and "subsidy" elements."' Re-
gional and lesser airlines are generally still on subsidy, but beginning
about 1951 most of the trunk lines gradually achieved subsidy-free
status, thereafter receiving only service pay.' 56
Subsidies have been paid on the basis of the carriers' needs. Thus
the profitable domestic operations of a carrier are set off against losses
in foreign flights so as to reduce the amount of the subsidy to a figure
that matches the overall need of the carrier.1 7 This policy obviously
'
5 1 See Atlas Corp., Control Relationships, 21 C.A.B. 425, 427 (1955) ; Seaboard
& W. Agreements, 18 C.A.B. 726 (1954); Trans-Tex. Control & Interlocking Rela-
tionships, 18 C.A.B. 570, 571-74 (1954); Lehman Bros. Interlocking Relationships,
15 C.A.B. 656 (1952); Air Freight Forwarder, 9 C.A.B. 473, 505-06 (1948), aff'd,
178 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1949), 197 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952); North Cent., 7 C.A.B.
639, 673 (1946).
152Rocky Mountain States Air Serv., 6 C.A.B. 695, 735-36 (1946). Accord,
West Coast, 6 C.A.B. 961, 1000 (1946). In Midet Aviation Corp., 21 C.A.B. 950,
959 (1955), the CAB renewed the certificate of a single line resort air carrier and
praised the carrier for having taken over the operation of a defunct resort hotel and
developed it in order to stimulate traffic.
15 3 But see Healy, supra note 122, at 230, 238.
154 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 406, 72 Stat. 763, 49 U.S.C. § 1376 (1958).
See Capital Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 171 F.2d 339, 340 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
336 U.S. 961 (1949); Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 171 F.2d 139, 140 (D.C. Cir.
1948); American Airlines, Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 323 (1942); WESTMEYER, Eco-
NOMIcS OF TRANSPORTATION 547 (1952) ; AiRLINES REPoRT 8-17.
'55 See Domestic Trunklines, Serv. Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 8 (1955); American
Airlines, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 558, 569-70 (1951). Compare Mail Transp. by
Noncertified Carriers, 18 C.A.B. 201, 206-07 (1953); Wnmcox, PuBLIc POLIcIES
ToWARD BUSINESs 637-38 (1955).
156 Howell, The Rate of Return in Air Transport, 24 LAw & CONTEmp. PROB.
677, 678, 681 (1959). Subsidies in general are discussed in Gellman, The Regulation
of Competition in Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis,
24 J. Am L. & Com. 410, 426 (1957); Koontz, supra note 122, at 129-31. See
WImcox, op. cit. supra note 155, at 642.
15 Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Summerfield, 347 U.S. 74, 78-79 (1954); Braniff
Airways, Inc., IA Av. L. REP. 22305 (C.A.B. Sept. 4, 1959) ; cf. American Overseas
Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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may encourage uneconomic routings and has caused the whole subject
of subsidy to be subjected to anxious scrutiny.'5
Administration of Subsidy Payments
One interesting feature of the subsidies is that they may be paid
on a retroactive basis. It is not necessary, therefore, to estimate
future costs: actual figures may be used." 9 This method, unlike that
commonly employed in utility ratemaking, avoids many speculative
pitfalls but does not, of course, eliminate the tangled problem of al-
locating common costs. 6 Cost, plus a rate of return, is the CAB's
touchstone in granting subsidies.' 0 '
Rates of return have been more generous than in public utility
regulation generally, as the CAB has believed that the carriers needed
additional profit as an incentive to the rapid development of air
transport.162 To the extent that rates are fixed retroactively, however,
the profit allowed has been lower on the theory that risks have been
eliminated.1
63
In the administration of the subsidies, the CAB has achieved con-
siderable control over decisions otherwise within the purview of man-
agement. It has reviewed carrier equipment, eliminating costs as an
element in subsidy calculation when planes were found excessive in
158 A leading observer has complained that the nation's air transportation needs
have never been formulated and hence no useful guides have been created as to the
extent of subsidy which should be paid. Keyes, National Policy Toward Commercial
Aviation-Some Basic Problems, 16 J. AiR L. & Coat. 280, 281, 283-86, 297 (1949).
It has been suggested that the "needs" of the carriers, however formulated, are
not a satisfactory basis for the payment of subsidy in that the carriers are thus
deprived of an incentive to furnish more efficient and better service. Note, supra
note 136, at 1216. One writer complains that there is a curious feeling in government
and industry circles that an airline cannot be allowed to go bankrupt, whereas there
appears to be no basis in public policy for such an attitude. Koontz, supra note 122,
at 156. The relationship of subsidy to the conflict between the certificated and the
exempt carriers also has caused concern. See AmRiRNEs REPoRT 94-110; Keyes, A
Reconsideration of Federal Control of Entry into Air Transportation, 22 J. Am L.
& Com. 192, 193-94 (1955).
159 American Overseas Airlines v. CAB, 254 F.2d 744, 747, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
160 See Domestic Trunklines, Serv. Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 8, 37 (1955) ; American
Airlines, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 558, 571-72 (1951). The CAB exhibits a rather
extravagant caution lest its orders with respect to mergers, acquisitions, and the like
be deemed approval of various costs entering into rate and subsidy problems. See,
e.g., Trans-Tex. Control & Interlocking Relationships, 18 C.A.B. 570 (1954).
161 Ballard, Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HARv. L. REv. 1235, 1261-62
(1947) ; Keyes, sitpra note 158, at 282-84.
162 Pacific Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 1A Av. L. REP. ff 22278 (C.A.B. June 9,
1959) ; American Airlines, Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 323, 346-47 (1942) ; Barnes, Airline
Subsidies-Purpose, Cause and Control, 26 J. AIR L. & Com. 311, 316 (1959) ; Howell,
supra note 156, at 681. See generally Burt & Highsaw, Regulation of Rates in Air
Transportation, 7 LA. L. REv. 378-93 (1947) ; Koontz, supra note 122, at 128-32.
163 See Delta-C & S Mail Rate, Reopened, 1A Av. L. REP. 22318 (C.A.B.
Oct. 20, 1959). Questions have arisen as to whether subsidy payments should be
uniform for carriers serving the same or comparable routes. Pan Am. World Air-
ways v. CAB, 256 F.2d 711, 712 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958);
American Airlines, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 558, 565-69 (1951); American Airlines,
Mail Rates, 3 C.A.B. 323, 341 (1942). Sometimes the CAB varies the amount of
carriers' subsidies according to their respective "means"; on other occasions, it makes
the subsidy uniform for a group of carriers.
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number or scale. Thus, in a recent case, the expense of maintaining
one DC-3 aircraft was eliminated from the computations.164  Opera-
tions, too, fall under CAB scrutiny. When load factors are low, the
Board disregards costs thought to arise from "over-scheduling." 165
Various other expenses, principally those connected with sales efforts,
are also examined by the CAB and sometimes disallowed.166
Furnishing of Facilities
Almost all forms of transport have been subsidized in kind. It is
common, for example, to dredge harbors for the benefit of water car-
riers. Airlines are usually supplied with airports and associated facili-
ties and with elaborate navigational aids.'67 It would be hard to
compute the total amount of subsidy thus paid and comparison of the
facilities furnished various modes of transport is similarly difficult.
SERVICE
Safety
The Federal Aviation Act states that it shall be the duty of every
air carrier to provide safe and adequate service. 6 Although the CAB
164 Pacific Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122278 (C.A.B. June 9,
1959). Accord, Pan Am. World Airways, Latin Am. Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 775,
799-800 (1953); Southwest Airways, Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 301, 303-04 (1953);
Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C.A.B. 705, 718-19 (1949); Alaska Airlines, Mail
Rates, 10 C.A.B. 160, 173-74 (1949); Wmcox, op. cit. mipra note 155, at 642;
Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in Domestic Air Transportation--A Judicial
Survey & Analysis, 25 J. Am L. & Co. 148, 161-62 (1958). In other instances,
the CAB has reviewed managerial decisions with respect to equipment and allowed
the expense thereof as an element in the computation of subsidies. See Central
Airlines, Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 67, 70 (1955); American Airlines, Mail Rates, 10
C.A.B. 341, 343-44 (1949). The CAB is not unaware of the competitive impact of
so-called "excess" equipment. See Trans-Pac. Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Mail
Rates, 20 C.A.B. 668, 670-77 (1955). In this case, the CAB imposed harsh strictures
on an airline which had secured better equipment than its rival; the Board found
that there had been an attempt to "throttle" the competitor by providing uneconomic
capacity. Id. at 676.
165 Pacific Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 1A Av. L. RaP. 122278 (C.A.B. June 9,
1959) ; American Airlines, Mail Rates, 14 C.A.B. 558, 566-67 (1951) ; Capital Airlines,
Mail Rates, 10 C.A.B. 705, 711-17, 734-37 (1949) ; Pioneer Airlines, Mail Rates,
8 C.A.B. 175, 192-95 (1947). Compare Northern Consol. Airlines, Mail Rates, 21
C.A.B. 243, 245 (1955) ; Central Airlines, Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 67, 71 (1955).
166 Transatlantic Final Mail Rates, 19 C.A.B. 464, 483 (1954); Wien Alaska
Airlines, Mail Rates, 18 C.A.B. 130, 134 (1953). The CAB has also eliminated
entertainment expenses, club dues, and donations. See Continental Airlines, Mail
Rates, 21 C.A.B. 811, 825 (1955); Wimcox, op. cit. mupra note 155, at 642; 1941
CAB ANN. RaP. 6-7; 1 CAA ANN. Rap. 21 (1940). Note the stay of order in Flint-
Grand Rapids Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. ff 22377 (C.A.B.
April 29, 1960). There the CAB had directed Capital Airlines to provide more
service but stayed the effect of the order pending resolution of the carrier's
financial plight.
167 See Ozark Airlines, Davenport/Moline Serv., 21 C.A.B. 874, 881 (1955);
Henry, The Impact of Air Freight on Surface Transportation, 15 LAw & CoNTEMP.
PROn. 47, 56 (1950); Note, supra note 136, at 1201-02. Somewhat oddly the CAB
appears to have no control over the issuance of securities by airlines.
.68 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §404(a), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(a)
(1958). An airline passenger, complaining of the cancellation of a scheduled flight,
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is charged with the investigation of accidents," 9 current statutes pro-
vide that safety controls are to be exercised by an AdministratorY.
70
The Administrator licenses pilots and aircraft, prescribes flight pro-
cedures, and sets operational patterns, particularly near busy airports. 7 '
While such matters are not of central concern here, it should be noted
that safety regulation may have an economic impactY.
1 2
Schedules
In several ways, the CAB enjoys considerable authority over the
operational aspects of the air carriers' business. In the first place,
like the Interstate Commerce Commission, it has the power to cer-
tificate a second carrier on a route in the event that the first does not
perform satisfactorily.7 3  Such a threat may well affect management
thinking on scheduling and similar matters. Second, as we have
seen, subsidized airlines are subject to disallowance of costs if they
disregard CAB "suggestions" with respect to scheduling,'7 4 equip-
ment, 75 selling expenses, and the like.' And finally, reading the
must allege exhaustion of his remedies before the CAB before proceeding in court.
"Cancelling" a scheduled flight is a "practice" under the jurisdiction of the CAB.
Adler v. Chicago & So. Air Lines, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Mo. 1941). Compare
Interstate Natural Gas Co. v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1953).
169 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 701, 72 Stat. 781, 49 U.S.C. § 1441 (1958).
170 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 307, 601, 72 Stat. 749, 775, 49 U.S.C.
881348, 1421 (1958).
'7' See 1 CAA ANN. REP. 31-37 (1940) ; Kahn, supra note 128, at 688-89.
172 Development of coach service, for example, was affected by fire hazards by
reason of the high density of the seating in the aircraft. CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRicE
PoLicY 215 (1958).
'73 Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, 1A Av. L. REP. 22270 (C.A.B. May 19,
1959) ; Ozark Certificate Renewal, 21 C.A.B. 86, 87 (1955); Parks Investigation,
11 C.A.B. 779 (1950), af'd, 197 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831
(1952). Note the explicit discussion of this topic by way of dictum in Flint-Grand
Rapids Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, IA Av. L. REx'. 122377 (C.A.B. April 29,
1960).
174 Trans-Pac. Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 933, 935, 937
(1955); Trans-Pac. Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Mail Rates, 20 C.A.B. 668, 677-78
(1955); Pan Am. World Airways, Latin Am. Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 775, 803, 808
(1953) ; Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C.A.B. 705, 708-15 (1949). Increasing the
frequency of airlines' schedules may both attract traffic and at the same time de-
crease load factors. See Howell, supra note 156, at 694. Note the fixing of rates
for deferred service and the initial establishment of passenger coach transportation
in the night hours only. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 422 (D.C.
Cir. 1957); CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 172, at 188-92.
175 Pacific Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, IA Av. L. REP,. 1122278 (C.A.B. June 9,
1959) ; Southwest Airways, Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 301, 303-04 (1953). Another means
whereby the CAB can control equipment is afforded by § 408 of the Federal Aviation
Act. See Allen, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act: A Study in Agency
Law-making, 45 VA. L. REv. 1073, 1094-96 (1959).
-76 Braniff Airways, Inc., IA Av. L. REP. f 22305 (C.A.B. Sept 4, 1959);
Northern Consol. Airlines, Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 243, 247 (1955). See also text
accompanying notes 164-66 supra. As to revocation of certificates as a means of
controlling service, see text accompanying notes 196-98 infra.
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statute in a broader fashion, the CAB has recently decided that it may
directly order that specific services be rendered, and it has issued
such orders with respect to schedules. Finding, for example, that
commuting service was not available from Baltimore to New York,
it directed a revision of schedules to permit Baltimore citizens to fly
to Manhattan in the morning and return late in the day.17 7  It has
issued similar orders with respect to terminals. Finding that Toledo
service to several destinations was inadequate in volume and schedul-
ing, it directed sweeping changes.178 It has acted, too, with respect to
equipment. Finding service from Flint-Grand Rapids to New York
inadequate in equipment, it directed the carrier to install jet-prop
planes on the route.Y Most such direct orders have been issued only
recently; one such order has been sustained by the courts.' Should
the CAB be thus encouraged to enter similar orders in the future, the
discretion formerly vested in management will be vastly reduced.
177 Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, 1A Av. L. REP.
1122376 (C.A.B. April 29, 1960). In the same case, the CAB required additional
morning flights from Baltimore to Richmond and objected to the scheduling of
Baltimore-Chicago flights because there was no arrival in Baltimore prior to 2:10 p.m.
Furthermore, it directed each of three airlines (Eastern, National, and Northeast)
to provide a round trip daily to Florida from Baltimore. Accord, Flint-Grand
Rapids Adequacy of Serv., IA Av. L. RELP. 1122377 (C.A.B. April 29, 1960). In
the latter case, the CAB, finding that Capital Airlines had shown serious deficiencies
with respect to adherence to its schedules, required the filing of on-time reports with
respect to the Flint-Grand Rapids destination.
178 Toledo Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, IA Av. L. REP. 1122325 (C.A.B.
Nov. 10, 1959). Accord, Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv., 1A Av. L. RE,.
1 22376 (C.A.B. April 29, 1960). See also Braniff Airways, Serv. to Fairmont &
Fort Dodge, 20 C.A.B. 720 (1955) ; Service to Ely, 20 C.A.B. 402 (1955).
179 Flint-Grand Rapids Adequacy of Serv. Investigation, 1A Av. L. RaP. 1 22377
(C.A.B. April 29, 1960). In the same case, the airline was required to use pressurized
equipment on runs to Flint and Grand Rapids. Accord, Washington-Baltimore Ade-
quacy of Serv., 1A Av. L. REP. 1122376 (C.A.B. April 29, 1960). In the latter case,
however, the CAB declined to direct United Airlines to provide coach service to
Toledo. Note, however, that the CAB declined to intervene in the famous "cock-
tail" dispute over the serving of alcoholic beverages. Capital Airlines, Inc. v. North-
west Airlines, Inc., 18 C.A.B. 145 (1953).
180 Capital Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 281 F.2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Compare
Bluestone, The Problem of Competition Anong Domestic Trunk Airlines, 20 J. Am
L. & Com. 379, 398 (1953), with Keyes, supra note 158, at 288-93. At one time it
was believed that the airlines were free to indulge in service competition without
interference by the CAB. See Gellman, The Regulation of Competition in United
States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and Analysis, 25 J. Am
L. & Coas. 148, 156-57 (1958); Note, supra note 136, at 1200-01. When a destina-
tion is found to require additional service, the CAB considers that it has power to
single out one carrier authorized to haul traffic to that point and place the burden
of additional service upon it. In choosing such a carrier, it takes account of several
factors, including the relative amount of traffic enjoyed, the amount of restrictions
on carriers' routes, failure to provide service, and the historical status of the carrier
in the market. Washington-Baltimore Adequacy of Serv., 1A Av. L. RaP. 1122376
(C.A.B. April 29, 1960). In that case, however, the burdens imposed on Capital
Airlines were suspended in view of that carrier's precarious financial condition.
Note also the decision in Seven States Area Investigation, 1A Av. L. RaP. 1122326
(C.A.B. Nov. 10, 1959), where the CAB imposed employee protective conditions on
the airlines; trunk lines terminating service at various destinations were required
to pay the expenses of moving employees to new places of work.
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Service and Competition
Impressive evidence supports the thesis that service standards
have been raised by permitting competition among airlines. Capital
Airlines, for example, was granted a second certificate on the Chicago-
Twin Cities route and immediately Northwest Airlines, the holder of
the original certificate, increased its scheduling."8' A careful study of
the role of competition along many routes led to the conclusion that
"competition has been and continues to be an important force in assur-
ing the traveler a high standard of schedule service." '
This conclusion, however, is limited to the entry of a second
carrier. Addition of third, fourth, and subsequent airlines to a route
appears not to improve service; 183 indeed, deterioration in service may
occur when three or more carriers are granted certificates for the
same run. In some areas, even granting a second certificate may result
in lower service standards.
184
Equipment, as well as scheduling, benefits from some degree of
competition-innovation in general is in some measure a product of
competition. 85  And, in passing, we may note that innovation-and
particularly the introduction of faster planes-has a marked impact
upon competitive volume.186 While in general the CAB has not
181 Chicago-Milwaukee-Twin Cities, IA Av. L. REP. 122307 (C.A.B. Sept. 15,
1959) (supplemental opinion). The beneficial effects of competition upon service
have frequently been noted by the CAB. See Through Serv. Investigation, 16 C.A.B.
6, 39-40 (1952); Additional Serv. to Puerto Rico, 12 C.A.B. 430, 482-83 (1951);
Hawaiian Airlines Ltd., 7 C.A.B. 83, 103-04 (1946); Colonial Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B.
552, 554-55 (1944); Transcontinental & W. Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 373, 375 (1943).
182 GILL & BATES, AIRINE COmPETITION 109 (1949). Other comments to the
same effect are found in id. at 155, 157-58, 183-85, 201-02, 205-13, 218-25, 228-29,
245-46, 275, 287-88, 296, 317, 324; CHERINGTON, op. cit. sipra note 172, at 12, 14,
208-09, 215-16; Gellman, mipra note 180, at 155; Hector, Problems in Economic
Regulation of Civil Aviation, 26 J. Am L. & Com. 101, 105 (1959); Taaffe, A Map
Analysis of United States Airline Competition, 25 J. Am L. & Com. 121, 147 (1958).
183 GILL & BATES, op. cit. supra note 182, at 219-21, 234, 238, 266-69, 293, 333,
344. But there is also evidence to the effect that competition is relatively unimportant
with respect to service standards. Id. at 122, 156, 157, 160-62, 174, 308-09; CHER-
INGToN, op. cit. supra note 172, at 224; Keyes, supra note 158, at 196.
184 See Bristol Bay Area Trunkline, 17 C.A.B. 1109, 1115 (1953); Bluestone,
slpra note 180, at 393; Richmond, Creating Competition Among the Airlines, 24 J.
Am L. & Com. 435, 447 (1957).
185 GILL & BATES, op. cit. supra note 182, at 3. See CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra
note 172, at 11; GILL & BATES, op. cit. supra note 182, at 64-66, 73, 76, 85-87, 91,
133-46; Hector, supra note 182, at 104; Maclay & Burt, Entry of New Carriers Into
Domestic Trunkline Air Transportation, 22 J. Am L. & Com. 131, 147-49 (1955).
It has been intimated that the grant of a temporary certificate to another carrier
pushed its rival into obtaining better airships. Trans-Pac. Airlines Ltd., 21 C.A.B.
253, 167-69 (1955). Forces other than competition also give rise to innovation.
CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 172, at 290-94; GILL & BATES, op. cit. supra note
182, at 67-68; 1956 EASTERN AIRLINES ANN. REiP. 18; Bluestone, supra note 180, at
400. The foregoing do not indicate that competition has no role whatever in causing
innovation. They do suggest, however, that factors other than the immediate com-
petition of other airlines have been responsible for some changes.
186 See generally CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 172, at 11; GILL & BATES, op.
cit. supra note 182, at 267-69, 307-08; Taaffe, supra note 182, at 147; International
Airlines: The Great Jet Gamble, Fortune, June 1958, pp. 120, 124.
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blocked technological change," 7 instances can be found where it has
at least failed to encourage the introduction of new equipment.' Of
course, it can never be conclusively demonstrated whether air transport
would have advanced more rapidly had the industry not been regu-
lated.""9
Whether CAB-type competition has been a favorable factor in the
development of traffic remains open to question.'9 9 But however
measured, from whatever cause, and regardless of what might have
happened in the absence of either regulation or a measure of competi-
tion, air traffic has grown rapidly.191
Abandonment and Revocation
The act requires certificate holders to render service'. 2 and for-
bids abandonment of a route without CAB approval. 9 ' The Board
follows no rigid pattern: abandonment is often allowed ' but on occa-
sion the carrier is compelled to continue service."'
The CAB also enjoys express statutory power to revoke the cer-
tificates it has granted.'96 It may not, however, even go so far as to
187 See, e.g., Continental Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 215, 234 (1943); KEYES, FED-
ERAL CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AiR TRANSPORTATION 243-45, 308-09, 310-11 (1951).
188 Trans-Pac. Airlines, Hawaiian Airlines, Mail Rates, 21 C.A.B. 933, 934-35
(1955); Pan Am. World Airways, Latin Am. Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 775, 801-02
(1953) ; Pioneer Airlines, Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 499, 512-13 (1953) ; Transcontinental
Coach-Type Serv., 14 C.A.B. 720 (1951); Capital Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C.A.B.
705, 715-16 (1949); American Airlines, Mail Rates, 10 C.A.B. 341, 344-45 (1949);
All Am. Aviation, Pick Up, Delivery Serv., 2 C.A.B. 133 (1940). See Transconti-
nental Coach-Type Serv., suPra at 728 (dissenting opinion).
189 The casual observer might well believe that the airlines had been slow to
adopt the jet engine used by the military in World War II. There is, however, no
way to establish that the CAB was in any way responsible for the delay.
190 CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 172, at 16-18; GILL & BATES, op. cit. mpra
note 182, at 31-32; Bluestone, supra note 180, at 299, 393-94; Taaffe, supra note 182,
at 402, 407, 409, 420.
191 See BIGHAM & ROBERTS, TRANSPORTATION 115 (1952); GILL & BATES, op.
cit. vipra note 182, at 18-19; AImLINEs REPORT 68, 236-37; Smith, Regulation of
Returis to Transportation Agencies, 24 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 702, 711 (1959).
192 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §404(a), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. §1374(a)
(1958).
'93 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(j), 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(j)
(1958). Interruption of service because of adverse weather conditions does not
require CAB approval. 14 C.F.R. § 206.1 (1956). The procedure whereby an air
carrier may secure authority for temporary suspension of service is outlined in 14
C.F.R. §§ 205.1-.6 (1956); 14 C.F.R. § 205.7 (1959).
194 See American Airlines, Inc., 20 C.A.B. 565 (1955); Service to Trenton, 20
C.A.B. 290, 312 (1955); Northwest Airlines, Suspension of Aberdeen Serv., 19
C.A.B. 773 (1955); Texas Local Serv., 18 C.A.B. 34, 55 (1953).
195 Northwest Airlines, Elimination of Kalispell Serv., 21 C.A.B. 114, 125-26
(1955) ; cf. KEYES, op. cit. supra note 187, at 258. See generally Keyes, supra note
158, at 199-200. Compare West Coast, 6 C.A.B. 961, 978-79 (1946).
196 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 401(g), 72 Stat. 756, 49 U.S.C. § 1371(g)
(1958); American Air Transp. Revocation Proceeding, 16 C.A.B. 294, 300 (1952);
affd, 206 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir. 1953). See generally Netterville, The Regulation of
Irregular Air Carriers, 16 J. Am L. & Co.m. 414, 439-42 (1949). Compare Ryan,
The Revocation of an Airline Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, 15
J. Am L. & Com. 377 (1948).
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suspend a letter of registration without affording the carrier a hear-
ing.1'7 Revocation proceedings are commonly based upon failure to
furnish certificated service or willful violation of regulations."' 8 Here,
then, is another indirect method of compelling carriers to render
service.
Unfair Practices
In language obviously reminiscent of section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, the CAB is empowered to "investigate and
determine whether any air carrier . . .has been . . . engaged in un-
fair or deceptive practices or unfair methods of competition . . . ." If
such practices are found to exist, the Board may enter a cease and
desist order. 9' It seems to follow that air carriers are not subject to
the Federal Trade Commission Act.2"0 The CAB in fact enjoys pri-
mary jurisdiction in antitrust matters pertaining to airlines, except
perhaps in those as to which it cannot grant an appropriate remedy.
201
197 Standard Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir.), reversing 10 C.A.B.
486 (1949). Compare 14 C.F.R. §291.21(b) (1956).
108 Alaska Route Modification, 17 C.A.B. 943, 947 (1953) ; American Air Transp.,
Revocation Proceeding, 16 C.A.B. 294, 301 (1952), aff'd, 206 F.2d 423 (D.C. Cir.
1953); Parks Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 779, 783-84 (1950), aff'd, 197 F.2d 397 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 831 (1952) ; Standard Airlines, Noncertified Operations,
10 C.A.B. 486, 503-04, rev'd on other grounds, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949);
Tri-State Aviation Corp., 4 C.A.B. 100 (1943). See generally Keyes, supra note
158, at 202. In at least one instance the CAB refused to revoke a certificate in order
to maintain existing competition. Through Serv. Investigation, 16 C.A.B. 6, 31, 34
(1952).
199 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 411, 72 Stat. 769, 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1958).
200 Levi, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Regulated Industries, in N.Y.
ST. BAR Ass'N SYMposium 136, 138 (1959).
201 S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert.
denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952); Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transp.
Ass'n of America, 107 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). In the S.S.W. case the court
wrote: "[If the antitrust laws apply to public utilities] we might have the spectable
[sic] of courts throughout the country enjoining practices as violations of the anti-
trust laws even though the agency specifically authorized to deal with them has
determined or may decide, subject to judicial review, that such practices serve the
interests of the national air transportation policy." 191 F.2d at 663. In the Apgar
case, the court wrote: "The action directly involves the economic conduct of air
carriers, a matter subject to the 'detailed and comprehensive' regulation by the [Civil
Aeronautics] Board . . . . The air transportation industry is a regulated industry
which, in the considered judgment of Congress, has been given a special status with
relation to the antitrust laws. It is the national policy that unbridled competition
in that industry is not in the national interest, and the CAB has been entrusted with
the responsibility of making the accommodation between monopoly and competition,
in the public interest." 107 F. Supp. at 709. Compare Interstate Natural Gas Co.
v. Southern Cal. Gas Co., 209 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Hawaiian Airlines, Ltd.
v. Trans-Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 73 F. Supp. 68 (D. Hawaii 1947), rev'd, 174 F.2d 63
(9th Cir. 1949). As to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, see generally DAVIs,
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §§ 19.01-.07 (1958). A different viewpoint was
taken in Slick Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199 (D.N.J.
1951), aff'd on other grounds sub noin. American Airlines, Inc. v. Forman, 204 F.2d
230 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 806 (1953). In that case the plaintiff sought
treble damages by reason of an alleged conspiracy to drive it out of business. In the
course of the opinion the trial court wrote: "The essence of the complaint is that
the defendants, in violation of the anti-trust laws, have conspired to exclude plaintiff
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Somewhat surprisingly, the CAB's principal utilization of its
powers against unfair practices is found in the area known to the
common law as unfair competition. Thus, the Board has required
several airlines to change their names so as not to be confused with
established carriers 20 Proceedings have also been initiated against
various forms of misrepresentation, such as the issuance of docu-
ments resembling tickets but not actually entitling the patron to car-
riage.
203
As intimated above, the CAB has encouraged competition in
service among the carriers. Accordingly, it has rarely attacked the
rendering of extra services as an unfair practice. Capital Airlines com-
plained that its rival, Northwest, had engaged in unfair competition
in that it was serving liquor on first-class flights in violation of state
law. The CAB declined to act, suggesting that the remedy lay in the
courts of the several states involved. 4 And despite adverse congres-
sional comment, 0 5 the CAB appears to have taken little interest in
various exclusive agreements which carriers have entered into with
noncarriers. 206
from the field of air freight transportation. Normally, the jurisdiction of such a
charge rests with the courts under the anti-trust laws. To a certain extent the anti-
trust laws have been superseded by legislation in regulating specific fields of activity.
But, regulated industries are not per se exempt from the Sherman Act . . . . With
regard to the type of relief prayed for in the form of damages, there appears to be
nothing in the Civil Aeronautics Act which indicates a suspension of the anti-trust
laws." 107 F. Supp. at 206-07. It is interesting to note the assumption in the fore-
going language that the regulatory statute has the same substantive provisions as
the antitrust laws and that the only question is an adjective one of choice of forum.
Compare McCrea v. Detroit City Gas Co., 24 P.U.R. (n.s.) 225, 227 (Mich. Pub.
Util. Comm'n 1938); Illinois Coal Operators' Ass'n v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke
Co., 7 P.U.R. (ns.) 403, 423 (Ill. Commerce Comm'n 1934).
202 Air America, Section 411 Proceeding, 18 C.A.B. 810, 813-14, 826-29 (1954);
North Am. Airlines, Section 411 Proceeding, 18 C.A.B. 96, 98-103 (1953), aff'd,
351 U.S. 79, 86 (1956), reversing 228 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1955). Compare Aerovias
Venezolanas, Foreign Permit, 20 C.A.B. 746, 747 (1955); Pacific W., Irregular
Canada-United States Serv., 19 C.A.B. 270, 273 (1954).
203 Airline Reservations, Enforcement Proceeding, 18 C.A.B. 114, 121 (1953).
Comparable cases are Eastern Airlines Overbooking Enforcement Proceeding, IA
Av. L. RFP. 22359 (C.A.B. Feb. 26, 1960) ; Standard Airlines, Noncertified Opera-
tions, 10 C.A.B. 486, 502, rev'd on other grounds, 177 F.2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949). See
also Gellman, supra note 180, at 162-63.
204 Capital Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 18 C.A.B. 145 (1953).
Generally in accord are National Airlines Enforcement Proceeding, 1A Av. L. REP.
122358 (C.A.B. Feb. 24, 1960); States-Alaska Fare, 21 C.A.B. 354, 362 (1955);
Pan. Am. Ferry Flight, 18 C.A.B. 214, 226 (1953). The National Airlines case
involved an essay prize contest among passengers. It was held not to constitute an
unfair method of competition. The States-Alaska Fare case involved operation of
DC-6B equipment at the same fare as the older, slower DC-4 plane operated by a
rival. Again, no unfair competitive practice was found. See also Gellman, supra
note 180, at 155-58. Compare City Ice & Fuel Co. v. Consolidated Edison Co., 29
P.U.R. (n.s.) 193 (N.Y. Dep't Pub. Serv. 1939); Groggins v. N.Y. Edison Co.,
16 P.U.R. (n.s.) 365 (N.Y. Dep't Pub. Serv. 1936) (promotional campaign by public
utility companies to encourage sale of appliances).
205 AnIINrS REPORT 251-53, 256-60, 262-64, 277-78.
206 Compare Mansfield Journal Co. v. FCC, 180 F.2d 28, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1950);
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 168 F. Supp. 456 (M.D. Tenn. 1958), aff'd,
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TRADE ASSOCIATIONS
Joint Activity with Respect to Rates
Air carriers must submit agreements with other airlines to the
CAB for approval," 7 and it thus follows that trade association activity
generally is under Board control. Among the most important of joint
programs are those relating to rates. The CAB has approved an
agreement providing for uniform classification of freight and voluntary
advance notice of rate changes. It required elimination, however, of
a provision for mandatory advance notice of tariff alterations on the
ground that it would deprive carriers of opportunities to gain com-
petitive advantage. The Board has also required that all carriers de-
siring to do so be permitted to participate in the joint filing of rates.2"'
For reasons of economy and clarity the CAB looks with marked favor
upon collaboration in the mechanical consolidation of tariffs into a
single document. 9 Many observers have complained that the CAB
allows the carriers too much collaboration in the important matter of
pricing. It requires no involved calculation to demonstrate that such
activity is incompatible with a full measure of competition.21°
Other Joint Activity
Airlines collaborate also in other respects. A principal activity
has been the selection, compensation, and control of travel agents.
Here the CAB has found the trade asociations' actions to be in the
public interest notwithstanding adverse comment from outside
sources.211  Airline trade associations, like those in other industries,
also engage in lobbying, public relations, and similar activities.
212
276 F.2d 766 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 363 U.S. 836 (1960) (No. 931); Standard
Airlines, Noncertified Operations, 10 C.A.B. 486, 502, rev'd on other grounds, 177
F2d 18 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
207 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §412(a), 72 Stat. 770, 49 U.S.C. §1382(a)
(1958).
208 Air Freight Tariff Agreement, 14 C.A.B. 424, 428-31 (1951). The CAB
has not, however, encouraged domestic carriers to engage in general discussion with
respect to rates. Burt & Highsaw, Regulation of Rates in Air Transportation, 7
LA. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1946); Gellman, supra note 180, at 176-77. Compare TAFF,
COMMERCIAL MOTOR TRANSPORTATION 627, 629 (1955). International rates are set
by IATA under no such limitations. IATA Traffic Conference Resolution, 6 C.A.B.
639, 641-42, 644-45 (1946); AIRLINES REPORT 196, 217-18, 224-26; Burt & Highsaw,
supra at 4-5, 14-16; Can Airlines Compete?, 180 THE EcONOMIST 51-53 (1956);
International Airlines: The Great Jet Gamble, Fortune, June, 1958, pp. 120, 228.
2 09 Air Freight Tariff Agreement, 14 C.A.B. 424, 427-28 (1951); 14 C.F.R.
§221.10(a) (1956); 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 27; 2 CAA ANN. REP. 8 (1940).
210 KEYES, op. cit. supra note 187, at 325; AIRINES REPORT 212, 226-27; Durham
& Feldstein, Regulation as a Tool in the Development of the Air Freight Industry,
34 VA. L. REv. 769, 801-02 (1948).
2 1 1 AIRLINES REPORT 189-216, 273-75.
2 12 Id. at 114, 125, 134, 159, 164, 170-79. Note the proceedings entitled Air Transp.
Ass'n Inspection, 1A Av. L. REP. 1122280 (C.A.B. June 10, 1959). Complaints are
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Participating in CAB Proceedings
A striking feature of the regulatory pattern-striking in contrast
to the free sector of the economy but similar to practice before the
FCC and ICC-is the freedom of third parties to appear and be heard
in regulatory proceedings. This right is evidenced in the act 21 and
has received a generously broad construction.214 In practice, almost
anyone may participate in a CAB proceeding. One city, for example,
may appear to contest the grant of a route to another municipality.
215
Carriers may, of course, protest the grant of certificates to rivals.216
Trade associations, too, participate in CAB proceedings, albeit not
without complaint from some quarters. 7
RATES
The Statutory Scheme
Airline pricing falls within a pattern familiar to public utility
regulation. Initiation of rates and rules is left to the carriers, which
must file tariffs with the CAB. 21 ' Deviation from the published tariffs
is, of course, forbidden, and they may normally be changed only upon
thirty days' notice. 9 Full power over the rates is vested in the CAB:
recorded in AnLIXNES REPORT 270-73. Compare id. at 280-83 (minority views);
International Airlines: The Great Jet Gamble, Fortune, June, 1958, pp. 120, 227.
213 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 401(c), (g), 1009, 72 Stat. 754, 796, 49
U.S.C. §§1371(c), (g), 1489 (1958). Compare 14 C.F.R. §202.3(b) (1956).
2 14 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 607, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ; Railway
Express Agency, Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 422, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Seaboard & W.
Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 181 F.2d 515, 519 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 963
(1950) ; cf. Pacific No. Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 592, 607 (D.
Alaska 1948) ; American Airlines, Inc. v. Standard Air Lines, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 135,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). Compare L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R., 311 U.S. 295,
304 (1940); Philco Corp. v. FCC, 257 F.2d 656, 658 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 946 (1959); Carolina Power & Light Co. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv.
Authority, 94 F.2d 520, 523 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S. 578 (1938); Kansas
Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of Independence, 79 F.2d 32, 35 (10th Cir. 1935) ; Arkansas-
Missouri Power Co. v. City of Kennett, 78 F.2d 911 (8th Cir. 1935). Proceedings
before the CAB are, with some limitations, subject to the "Ashbacker" rule. CAB v.
State Airlines, Inc., 338 U.S. 572, 578-79 (1950); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,
271 F.2d 752, 757 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 970 (1960); National Air-
lines, Inc. v. CAB, 249 F.2d 13, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 247 F.2d 562, 565 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
215 Greensboro-High Point Airport Authority v. CAB, 231 F.2d 517, 521-22 (D.C.
Cir. 1956).
216 Transatlantic Cargo, 21 C.A.B. 671, 674 (1954); Trans-Pac. Certificate Re-
newal, 21 C.A.B. 253, 257 (1955). The point appears to have been assumed in Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 147 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1945). Compare Southwest Airways,
Mail Rates, 17 C.A.B. 301 (1953).
2 1 7 AiL-NEs REPORT 160, 168, 171, 183.
218Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §403(a), 72 Stat. 758, 49 U.S.C. §1373(a)
(1958).
219Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§403(b), (c), 72 Stat. 759, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1373(b), (c) (1958). Under the provisions of § 404(a), air carriers are under a
duty to establish joint rates with other carriers.
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it may set maximum or minimum, or maximum and minimum levels,
altering the tariffs according to a somewhat elaborate set of statutory
standards.220 In part, the CAB has exercised its powers through the
promulgation of regulations.22 One interesting provision allows the
changing of tariffs without thirty days' notice to correct clerical and
similar errors, but not to meet the lower rates of a competing carrier.22
Supplementary provisions authorize the CAB to prescribe the
form of the carrier's accounts and to call upon the airlines to render
reports. 223  Regulations have been promulgated implementing the
statute and a perusal of them leaves the impression that the airlines
are tightly bound in red tape.224 In these circumstances, one may con-
clude that-while some exceptions exist, notably in respect to inter-
national routes 2 5-the CAB exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the
tariffs of air carriers.2 6
220 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§ 1002(d), (e), 72 Stat. 789, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1482(d), (e) (1958). In fixing rates the Board is directed to take into considera-
tion their effect on the movement of traffic; the need of adequate transportation at
the lowest possible cost; standards with respect to quality of service; the inherent
advantages of air transport; and the need of the carrier for revenues to provide ade-
quate service. There is nothing to indicate which of the foregoing considerations is
to be given greater weight in the event of conflict among them. In Capital Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 171 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 961 (1949), the
court made the following comment with respect to rate-fixing provisions of the
former statute: "The [Civil Aeronautics] Act, with its regulatory provisions, is not
intended to underwrite profitable operation of a carrier's business, any more than
statutes imposing regulation of public utilities are intended to insure them a net
revenue." 171 F.2d at 340.
22114 C.F.R. §§207.4, 221.38(a) (1956); 14 C.F.R. §221.3 (Supp. 1960). See
generally Air Freight Tariff Agreement, 14 C.A.B. 424, 426-27 (1951).
222 14 C.F.R. §221.190 (a) (1956). See generally 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 27;
1 CAA ANN. REP. 22 (1939); Burt & Highsaw, supra note 208, at 3. The tariffs
filed by the carriers are rigidly binding upon them and the shippers. Rosch v.
United Airlines, 146 F. Supp. 266, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Furrow & Co. v. American
Airlines, 102 F. Supp. 808 (W.D. Okla. 1952); New York & Honduras Rosario
Mining Co. v. Riddle Airlines, Inc., 3 App. Div. 2d 457, 461-64, 162 N.Y.S.2d 314,
319-21 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 4 N.Y.2d 755, 149 N.E.2d 93, 172 N.Y.S.2d 168
(1958). Compare Pan Am. Ferry Flight, 18 C.A.B. 214, 215-17, 219-20 (1953);
Continental Charters, Tariff Rule, 16 C.A.B. 772, 774 (1953).
223Federal Aviation Act of 1958, §§407(a), (d), 72 Stat. 766, 49 U.S.C.
§§ 1377(a), (d) (1958). The CAB also controls the length of time the records
must be kept. 1942 CAB ANN. REP. 33.
224 E.., 14 C.F.R. § 242.2 (Supp. 1960); 14 C.F.R. §§ 248.1, .3, 249.7 (1956).
225 Furrow & Co. v. American Airlines, 102 F. Supp. 808, 809 (W.D. Okla. 1952).
Compare Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-70 (1956); Montana-Dakota Utils.
Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251-52 (1951); Pennsylvania
Water & Power Co. v. Consolidated Gas, Elec. Light & Power Co., 184 F.2d 552,
565 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 906 (1950); Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v.
Federal Power Comm'n, 141 F.2d 27, 30 (7th Cir. 1944); Consolidated Gas, Elec.
Light & Power Co. v. Siggins, 99 F. Supp. 151, 154 (M.D. Pa. 1951) ; Mandel Bros.
v. Chicago Tunnel Terminal Co., 2 Ill. 2d 205, 117 N.E.2d 774 (1954); Trienens,
Types of Questions Subject to the Primary Jurisdiction of Administrative Agencies,
13 ABA ANzqTITRUST REP. 42, 44 (1958).
2 2 6 TROXEL, ECONOmICS OF TRANSPoRT 35 (1955); AIRLINES REPORT 229, 231,




The tendency of the Board has been to hold maximum rates down
when the airlines have been profitable and to permit increases in less
happy circumstances. 2 In 1942 traffic had increased and the CAB
pushed rates down by informal procedures. In 1945 profits were
again large and the CAB reduced service mail pay. After the end of
World War II, however, traffic slumped and two rate increases were
allowed. In 1952 the airlines again were unprofitable and the CAB
permitted the addition of one dollar per ticket to all fares 2 s A general
passenger fare investigation followed but was not completed.2 9 In
1956 rates stood at levels only slightly higher than those prevailing in
1942.230 Yielding to congressional pressure, the CAB in that year
initiated a second general passenger fare investigation, premised on the
theory that rates were too high. By January 1957, however, cir-
cumstances had changed and the carriers sought an increase which the
CAB tentatively denied in September of that year. Deterioration of
earnings continued and in February 1958, the CAB authorized up-
ward adjustments of tariffs. In October of that year elimination of
round-trip and similar discounts effected another increase. 3 1 The
general fare investigation continued and finally, in June 1960, rates
went up again about five per cent. 2  Presumably another period of
profits would again induce the CAB to order reductions.
On the minimum side, the CAB has employed its powers vigor-
ously to protect the revenues of carriers against the "erosion" of "de-
& Highsaw, supra note 208, at 4, 5-6, 18; Stoffel, American Bilateral Air Transport
Agreements on the Threshold of the Jet Transport Age, 26 J. AIR L. & Com. 119,
134 (1959). Note that the CAB has no power of reparation: it cannot award
damages for breach of air tariffs. Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d
499, 502 (2d Cir. 1956). Its control over some accounting methods, e.g., deprecia-
tion charges, is confined to ratemaking proceedings. Alaska Airlines v. CAB,
257 F.2d 229, 230 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 881 (1958). The Board also
lacks direct authority to fix rates for exempt and private carriers. Federal Aviation
Act of 1958, §§ 101 (21), 401(a), 1002(b), 72 Stat. 738, 754, 788, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 (21),
1371(a), 1482(b) (1958). See generally Mail Transp. by Noncertified Carriers,
18 C.A.B. 201, 206 (1953); Burt & Highsaw, supra note 208, at 19-21; Netterville,
supra note 196, at 435-37.
227 Southern Serv. to the West, 12 C.A.B. 518, 534 (1951) ; CiaE-NGTON, ARLINE
PRIcE PoLIcy 74-89 (1958) ; Burt & Highsaw, Regulation of Rates in Air Transpor-
tation, 7 LA. L. REv. 378, 379 (1947) ; Hector, supra note 182, at 103-04.
228 CHERNGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 102; Howell, The Rate of Return in
Air Transport, 24 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 677, 681-82 (1959).
229 General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 230 (1953); AIRLINES
REPORT 267-68; Hector, supra note 182, at 106-07; Howell, supra note 228, at 682.
230 Smith, supra note 191, at 712.
231 Hector, supra note 182, at 101-02; Howell, supra note 228, at 683-84; Smith,
mipra note 191, at 716.
22 Some general discussion of the proceedings will be found in Altschul, Buoyant
Airlines, Barron's, June 22, 1959, pp. 5, 17.
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structive" competition.2 3 3  Its orders have met a mixed reception. 4
The CAB has not, however, been wholly inflexible: price reductions
have occasionally been approved, 235 "coach" service was reluctantly au-
thorized," 6 and the airlines were allowed to experiment with "pro-
motional" pricing.2 31
What emerges most clearly is a picture of informal pressures upon
carriers which are more important and more pervasive than rate-fixing
orders.2"' Though the airlines enjoy a legal right to initiate new
prices by filing tariffs,23 in practice it appears that the CAB maintains
a firm grip on all carriers' rates.24
Ratemaking Theories
As indicated above, the CAB seems to vary its ceiling on rates in
accordance with rough notions of proper profits for the carriers. At
233 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 422, 424-25 (D.C. Cir.
1957); States-Alaska Fare, 21 C.A.B. 354, 362-63 (1955); Air Freight Rate, 18
C.A.B. 22 (1953); Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 350-52 (1948); 1
CAA ANN. REP. 2 (1939).
234 CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 114-15; MuND, GOVERNMENT AND
BuSrNESs 538-39 (1955); Burt & Highsaw, supra note 227, at 394-97; Durham &
Feldstein, supra note 210, at 783-86; Gambrell & Moye, Position of the Certificated
Air Carriers in C.A.B. Freight Proceedings, 15 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 3, 15 (1950) ;
Note, Civil Aeronautics Board Policy, 57 YALE L.J. 1053, 1069-71 (1948). There is
evidence to indicate that airlines can be operated profitably on lower fares. WEST-
MEYER, EcoN omics OF TRANSPORTATION 544 (1952). Compare Maxwell, Regulation
of Motor Carrier Rates, 36 LAND EcoN. 79, 90-91 (1960).
235Air Freight Rate Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 228 (1950); CHERINGTON, op. Cit.
supra note 227, at 340-42; Ailes, The Position of the Freight Carriers Before the
Civil Aeronautics Board, 15 LAw & CoNTEmP. PROB. 17, 23, 25 (1950).
236 Pacific Airlines, Inc., Mail Rates, 1A Av. L. REP. f 22278.02 (C.A.B. June 9,
1959); Transcontinental Coach-Type Serv., 14 C.A.B. 720, 721 (1951); National
Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach, 14 C.A.B. 331 (1951); CHERINGTON, op. Cit.
supra note 227, at 93, 195, 204-07, 216. Note the cautious attitude of the Board
expressed in General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 230, 233 (1953).
237 CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 148-49; Gellman, The Regulation of
Competition in United States Domestic Air Transportation: A Judicial Survey and
Analysis, 25 J. AIR L. & CoM. 148, 149-50 (1958). See generally States-Alaska
Fare, 21 C.A.B. 354, 365, 391 (1955); Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257, 259-60
(1951) ; Investigation of Eastern Airlines Air-Coach Fare, 12 C.A.B. 511, 515 (1951).
238 Hawaiian Intraterritorial Serv., 10 C.A.B. 62, 66 (1948); Air Freight Rate
Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 358 (1948) ; CHERI NGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 5,
132-33, 449; 1 CAA ANN. REP. 22 (1939); Burt & Highsaw, supra note 227, at 7.
239 CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 83-84, 135, 160. Cherington com-
plains that the airlines have not performed their price initiation functions in a scien-
tific manner. Id. at 160-61, 164.
2 4
0 Id. at 69, 453; Gellman, supra note 237, at 180. But see KEYES, FEDERAL
CONTROL OF ENTRY INTO AIR TRANSPORTATION 312-16 (1951). Whether a "zone of
reasonableness" exists for airline rates may be open to question. Air Freight Tariff
Agreement, 14 C.A.B. 424, 429 (1951) ; Hawaiian Common Fares, 10 C.A.B. 921, 927
(1949) (indications that such a zone does exist). Compare Montana-Dakota Utils.
Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951); Georgia v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 460-61 (1945).
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the same time, there is evidence that the CAB has sometimes left the
details of ratemaking to the competitive impact of other modes of
transport.2 41  Over a considerable time, for example, first-class rail-
road passenger fares played an important role in determining the level
of airline charges.242 As the description of minimum rate orders sug-
gests, however, the CAB has not abdicated its role as price fixer in
favor of the forces of the market place. 43
Important illumination on the CAB's ratemaking theories is de-
rived from the subsidy cases. It is apparent that the controlling theory
is that of a return after meeting full costs.244 We need not here deter-
mine precisely how costs are ascertained: so far as the rate of return
is concerned-and here perhaps costs become irrelevant-the CAB
appears to be moved by the necessity of attracting new capital.
245 It
cannot be said, however, that the Board has developed a clear and
coherent theory of price control for air carriers. 46
241E.g., Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257, 258 (1951).
2 42 BIGHAM & ROBERTS, TRANSPORTATION 507 (1952) ;. CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra
note 227, at 2, 149-50, 343-44, 374; TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 226, at 737, 739-40;
WILcox, PUBLIC POLICIES TowARm BUSINESS 659 (1955); Dearing, The Reorgani-
zation of Transport Regulation, 40 Am. EcoN. REv. 261, 266 (1950) ; Gellman, supra
note 237, at 153; Hector, Problems in Economic Regulation of Civil Aviation, 26
J. Am L. & Com. 101, 106 (1959). See also Note, 50 YALE L.J. 875, 884-86 (1941).
Several of the foregoing authors indicate that competition-whether from other
scheduled airlines, nonscheduled carriers, or other modes of transport-is an impor-
tant force affecting airline rates.
243 Investigation of Eastern Airlines Air-Coach Fare, 12 C.A.B. 511, 514 (1951);
Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 343-44, 348 (1948); FREDERICK, COM-
MERCIAL Am TRANSPORTATION 174-75 (1955) ; Bluestone, The Problem of Competi-
tion Among Domestic Trunk Airlines, 20 J. Am L. & Cozr. 379, 394-96 (1953).
Compare Kentucky-Tenn. Light & Power Co., 41 P.U.R. (n.s.) 65, 74 (Tenn. Comm'n
1941); Service Gas Co., 15 P.U.R. (ns.) 202, 206-07 (Pa. Pub. Serv. Comm'n
1936), aff'd, 126 Pa. Super. 381, 190 Atl. 653 (1937).
244 Pan Am. Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 171 F.2d 139, 142 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
American Airlines, Domestic Trunklines, 21 C.A.B. 8, 35 (1955); Air Freight Rate
Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 344-45 (1948). See also General Passenger-Fare Inves-
tigation, 17 C.A.B. 230, 234 (1953). In merger cases the CAB has insisted upon
the writing off of "excessive values," meaning the amount by which the purchase
price exceeds the original cost to the selling carrier. E.g., Continental-Pioneer Ac-
quisition, 20 C.A.B. 323, 332 (1955); Trans-Tex. Airways, 20 C.A.B. 257, 258
(1955); Acquisition of Marquette by TWA, 2 C.A.B. 409, 415 (1940). Such action
suggests that the CAB is proceeding on original cost as a basis of ratemaking. Re-
production cost as a basis has been rejected. 1943 CAB ANN. REP. 17-18. Compare
Burt & Highsaw, supra note 227, at 380, where it is indicated that the fundamental
policy of the CAB is to maintain revenues adequate to insure the maintenance of
service.
245 FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 243, at 164-65; Howell, supra note 228, at
697-99. Query whether the CAB employs the "operating ratio" method of fixing
prices. See Investigation of Eastern Airlines Air-Coach Fare, 12 C.A.B. 511, 514
(1951); Smith, Regulation of Returns to Transportation Agencies, 24 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 702, 710 (1959).
246See General Passenger-Fare Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 230, 235-36, 240-42
(1953) (dissenting opinion) ; CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 5, 73; KEnEs,
op. cit. supra note 240, at 175, 318, 326; Gellman, supra note 237, at 159-60, 181.
1961]
354 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
DISCRIMINATION
Statutory Prohibitions
Public utility legislation generally prohibits discrimination in no
uncertain language,24 7 and the Federal Aviation Act is no exception.
It declares that no air carrier shall give any undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage to any particular person, port, locality, or
description of traffic, or subject any person to any unjust discrimina-
tion.2 48 One court has said that the primary purpose of the Act is to
assure uniformity of rates and services to all persons using the car-
riers' facilities. 249 Nevertheless, airlines may be compelled to render
some services at a "loss" provided their overall operations are not
unprofitable. 50
Against Persons
Deferring to the general legislative proscription, the CAB has
often disapproved rates and services of a preferential character.2 51 In
some instances, orders have prohibited comparatively simple types
of personal discrimination.2 52 More difficult of treatment, however,
247 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111%, § 38 (Smith-Hurd 1954).
248 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 404(b), 72 Stat. 760, 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b)
(1958).
249 N.Y. & Honduras Rosario Mining Co. v. Riddle Airlines, Inc., 3 App. Div.
2d 457, 462, 162 N.Y.S.2d 314, 319 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 4 N.Y.2d 755, 149
N.E.2d 93, 172 N.Y.S.2d 662 (1958). Note, however, the language in United Airlines,
Inc. v. CAB, 198 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1952), wherein it was said: "The Civil Aero-
nautics Act was enacted at a critical stage in the air transport industry, struggling
to survive in the face of excessive competition and a number of other adverse factors.
The Act was designed to bring out of chaos a system of regulated competition and
the encouragement and promotion of civil aviation, not only in the interests of com-
merce but also in the interests of national defense." Id. at 105.
250 Pan Am. World Airways v. CAB, 256 F.2d 711, 712-13 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 836 (1958). The court said that the carrier may be required to
charge a rate for particular service that is not "fully compensatory." What that
language means is not clear. See generally Burt & Highsaw, supra note 227; Gell-
man, supra note 237. Compare Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S.
481, 493 n.14 (1958); Produce Terminal Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 II1.
582, 593, 112 N.E.2d 141, 146 (1953). As noted in note 226 supra, the CAB has no
power to effect reparation if unlawful rates have been charged. As to the effect
thereof on antitrust enforcement, see Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439,
453 (1945) (dictum). Some late views with respect to the theory of discrimination
by public utilities will be found in DAVIDSON, PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN SELLING GAS
AND ELECTRICITY (1956); Hirshleifer, Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing, 72 Q.J.
EcoN. 451 (1958). In this connection, of course, the reader should bear in mind that
most discriminations arise out of competition.
251 Note the regulations embodied in 14 C.F.R. §§ 223.2, 225 (1956). Discrimina-
tion is, of course, related to fare changes affecting the entire rate structure. See
CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 399. See generally TRoxEL, op. cit. supra
note 226, at 741-68.
252 A fairly clear-cut case is Shulman, Inc. Enforcement Proceeding, 1A Av. L.
REp. ff22327 (C.A.B. Nov. 10, 1959). See States-Alaska Fare, 21 C.A.B. 354, 361,
370 (1955); Continental Charters, Tariff Rule, 16 C.A.B. 772, 774 (1953); Air
Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242, 251-54 (1942).
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are promotional features offered by the carrier as a justification for
reduced rates. An airline serving southern resorts, for example, may
offer excursion fares during summer months.25 Or an airline may
prepare a tour "package" whereby hotel and other accommodations
are included with transportation in a single price.25  Despite the
obvious possibility that such pricing might stimulate traffic, the CAB
has often disapproved the rates on the ground that discrimination
would result.255  In other instances, however-and the rationale of
distinction is far from clear-the CAB has allowed promotional
pricing. A discount was long available, for example, to passengers
who purchased round-trip tickets.256  Similarly, reduced "coach" fares
have been approved for service at off-peak hours and with less com-
fortable accommodations.2 57  It should be noted that promotional
pricing will not assist carriers to meet their total costs unless demand
for their services is elastic; 258 and the evidence may indicate only a
small degree of elasticity.
259
Against Places
The statute also prohibits preferences against places. On occasion,
the CAB has carried this prohibition to almost pious extremes: it
insisted, for example, that fares from the mainland be lower to the
nearer of the Hawaiian Islands, saying that a flat rate to all points
in the group was discriminatory.260 Other decisions, however, have
253 Summer Excursion Fares, 11 C.A.B. 218 (1950).
254 Tour Basing Fares, 14 C.A.B. 257 (1951).
265 Pacific Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 903, 907-08 (1953).
Compare Air Freight Tariff Agreement, 14 C.A.B. 424, 429 (1951); Investigation
of Accumulation, 12 C.A.B. 337, 343 (1950). See also CHERINGTON, op. cit. mipra
note 227, at 158-59; Gellman, supra note 237, at 154-55. If the reduced rate can be
justified on a cost basis, no real issue arises and the CAB will grant its approval.
See, e.g., Pacific Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 903, 906 (1953).
256States-Alaska Fare, 21 C.A.B. 354, 364 (1955). Comparable decisions are
reported in National Airlines Enforcement Proceeding, 1A Av. L. REP. ir 22358
(C.A.B. Feb. 24, 1960); Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242,
248-54 (1942). See Gellman, supra note 237, at 149-50.
25 7 See States-Alaska Fare, 21 C.A.B. 354, 363 (1955) ; National Airlines, Inc.,
14 C.A.B. 331 (1951) ; TROXEL, op. cit. supra note 226, at 738. See also CHERINGTON,
op cit. supra note 227, at 117. Compare DAvmsoN, op. cit. supra note 250, at 96.
258 See TRoXEL, op. cit. .supra note 226, at 159-63, 169-93, 615-38.
259 See CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 155-56, 390-91, 437; TOXEL,
op. cit. supra note 226, at 159-63, 169-93. Contra, FREDERICK, op. cit. supra note 243,
at 166-67.
260 Hawaiian Common Fares, 10 C.A.B. 921 (1949). Accord, Pacific Northwest-
Alaska Tariff Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 903, 906-07 (1953). See CHERINGTON, op.
cit. supra note 227, at 295, 305. Compare Pacific Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investi-
gation, 18 C.A.B. 481-83 (1954) ; Summer Excursion Fares, 11 C.A.B. 218, 222 (1950) ;
Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 348-49 (1948). There must, of course,
be findings by the CAB on the issue of discrimination. Greensboro-High Point
Airport Authority v. CAB, 231 F.2d 517 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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looked in precisely the opposite direction.26' In addition, the CAB
has authorized reduced rates on "back-haul" flights 262 and sometimes
has increased rates by x dollars per ticket 2 ---which, of course, con-
stitutes another departure from pricing on a strict mileage basis. Even
more striking are orders requiring airlines to render service at termi-
nals where traffic is insufficient to induce voluntary scheduling of
flights. Northwest Airlines, for example, was directed to continue
to serve Kalispell, Montana, despite the out-of-pocket losses it had
incurred in landing at the low traffic terminal.2 Kalispell passengers
were thus subsidized by those originating at other points and the
latter were subject to a form of discrimination.265
Against Commodities
In most modes of transport, discrimination against high-value
commodities is open, admitted, and unquestioned. Rail and motor
freight, for example, is "classified": commodities with a high ratio
of mass to value, such as coal, stone, and wheat, move at far lower
rates than more valuable goods such as diamonds, machinery, and
whiskey.266  CAB regulations clearly contemplate the possibility of
similar discrimination in air freight movements.267  On the other hand,
the CAB's stand on rates only slightly above out-of-pocket costs is
equivocal: sometimes such pricing has been permitted 268 and in other
261 Pacific Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investigation, 18 C.A.B. 481, 482-83 (1954);
Pacific Northwest-Alaska Tariff Investigation, 17 C.A.B. 903, 905 (1953); West
Coast Common Fares, 15 C.A.B. 90 (1952).
262Air Freight Rate Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 228-36 (1950). Compare Air
Freight Rate Investigation, 20 C.A.B. 622, 624 (1955); Capital Airlines, Inc., Mail
Rates, 18 C.A.B. 457 (1954); Transcontinental Coach-Type Serv., 14 C.A.B. 720,
722-24 (1951); National Airlines, Inc., DC-6 Daylight Coach, 14 C.A.B. 331, 348-49
(1950). See BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 242, at 384; CHERINGTON, Op.
cit. supra note 227, at 149, 331-32, 339; TRoXEL, op. cit. supra note 226, at 740.
263 CHERINGTON, op. cit. supra note 227, at 370, 379. On the procedural problem
of the right of various persons to be heard, see Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 271
F.2d 752, 760 (2d Cir. 1959).
264 Northwest Airlines, Inc., 21 C.A.B. 114, 125 (1955). In subsequent proceed-
ings, a feeder carrier replaced Northwest at the terminal in question. Cf. Washington-
Baltimore Adequacy of Serv., IA Av. L. RP. 22376 (C.A.B. April 26, 1960).
Compare Air Freight Rate Investigation, 20 C.A.B. 622, 624 (1955); Air Freight
Rate Investigation, 11 C.A.B. 228, 236 (1950).
265 Keyes, A Reconsideration of Federal Control of Entry into Air Transpor-
tation, 22 J. AIR L. & Com. 192, 197-98 (1955) ; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 1196, 1211 (1951).
266 See Hale & Hale, Competition or Control III: Motor Carriers, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 775, 825-26 (1960).
267 14 C.F.R. § 221.39 (1954).
268 Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. CAB, 243 F.2d 422, 425 (D.C. Cir. 1957);




instances it has been roundly condemned.269 On occasion, patent
forms of discrimination have been prohibited."' Circumstances have
probably played an important role in minimizing the amount of dis-
crimination against commodities: air freight supplies only a small
fraction of the carriers' revenues and the number of commodities hauled
is relatively small.2 '
Quantity Discounts and Preventive Action
The CAB has been ready to recognize the cost savings inherent
in large volume shipments. It has permitted those savings to be
reflected in rates, provided that the discounts are closely related to the
savings.172  Furthermore, it does not appear that the CAB has gone
to the extravagant lengths of the ICC in taking preventive action
against potential discrimination. Perhaps the CAB has not been
faced with problems comparable to the "dual status" of common and
contract carriers. 73 And while the Board has forbidden an air freight
forwarder to act as the agent of a direct air carrier,7 it does not
otherwise seem to have insisted upon a rigid separation of functions.
2 69 See Air Freight Rate, 18 C.A.B. 22, 26 (1953); Air Freight Tariff Agree-
ment, 14 C.A.B. 424, 426 (1951) ; Air Freight Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 344-46
(1948). Compare Produce Terminal Corp. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 414 Ili.
582, 112 N.E.2d 141 (1953); BIGHAM & ROBERTS, op. cit. supra note 242, at 384.
2 7 0 American Airlines Enforcement Proceeding, 1A Av. L. REP. 1 22339 (C.A.B.
Dec. 8, 1959). But cf. Air Freight Rate, 1A Av. L. REP. 22303 (C.A.B. Sept. 2,
1959) (modification).
271 Needless to say the foregoing decisions of the CAB are scarcely compatible
with enforcement of the Robinson-Patman Act, 49 Stat. 1526, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13(a),
(b) (1958). Note also the adverse comment in AIRLINEs REPORT 53, 268. On the
general subject of discrimination Professor Clements has been quoted as follows:
"price discrimination and multiple product production are not exceptions to general
practice, but are rather the essence of customary action. The distinction between
a producer selling a single product at different prices and one selling different
products in varying markets at different percentages of profit is a distinction of degree
only . . . . Whatever the amount of profit, it is obtained only by constant manipu-
lation of the price and product line. The theory of price discrimination must be
viewed as the heart of price-cost theory rather than a peripheral case. The firm
that does not discriminate in its pricing policy, or differentiate in its product line,
or invade new markets, dies in the competitive struggle .... ." Marx, Group or
Conference Rate-Making and National Transportation Policy in the United States,
24 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 586, 592 (1959).
272Investigation of Accumulation, 12 C.A.B. 337, 341-44 (1950); Air Freight
Rate Investigation, 9 C.A.B. 340, 349-50 (1948); 14 C.F.R. §221.71 (1954). Com-
pare Air Passenger Tariff Discount Investigation, 3 C.A.B. 242, 251 (1942).
273 Hale & Hale, supra note 266, at 826.
27414 C.F.R. §296.3(a) (1956). But see Air Freight Forwarder, 11 C.A.B.
182, 190 (1949) (international). See text accompanying notes 140-53 supra with
respect to the enforced separation of air carriers from persons operating various other
modes of transport.
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CONCLUSIONS
Under existing legislation only a small residue of discretion re-
mains in the management of the airlines. The CAB determines who
shall enter the business and assigns entrants their routes. While the
carriers enjoy some discretion with respect to scheduling, the Board
controls the equipment they utilize, the rates they charge, and the
service they render. Airlines on subsidy do not even enjoy freedom
to choose their own methods of sales promotion. The CAB's powers,
in short, are so comprehensive and pervasive as almost to amount to
governmental operation.
Payment of cash subsidies is another factor which might affect
the application of the antitrust laws. Undeniably, the subsidy feature
tends to "even up" the results of operations and therefore to remove
both the carrot and the stick often thought necessary to goad competi-
tors into action. 5 The ruthless weeding out of inefficient firms con-
templated by a regime of "hard" competition is thwarted by the pay-
ment of cash subsidies. But subsidies are not, as yet, a permanent
characteristic of regulation: some airlines have been off subsidy for
several years, and it is contemplated that others will follow. Accord-
ingly, the payment of subsidies may have little impact upon the long-




In considering whether the antitrust laws should be applicable
to airlines, we should note that the CAB itself is engaged in a con-
siderable amount of "supplementary" antitrust enforcement under its
organic act. It may proceed against "unfair practices" much in the
same manner as does the Federal Trade Commission; it surely can
and does attempt to exorcise the demon of discrimination just as
energetically as if the strictures of the Robinson-Patman Act were
applicable to the carriers under its supervision. 7 7 The Supreme Court
has said that in fully regulated industries, whose members are forced
to charge only reasonable rates approved by appropriate commissions,
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that antitrust complaints
be referred to the administrative tribunal: 278 "That some resolution
is necessary when the antitrust policy of free competition is placed
275 Keyes, National Policy Toward Commercial Aviation-Some Basic Problems,
16 J. AI L. & Com. 280, 291-92 (1949).
276 K zYs, op. cit. supra note 240, at 345-46.
277 Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, 38 Stat 730, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13, 13a (1958),
apply only to the sale of commodities and not to the rendering of services. Fleetway,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Transp. Co., 72 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U.S.
626 (1935).
278 United States v. RCA, 358 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1959).
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beside a regulatory scheme involving fixing rates is obvious..
Accordingly, this Court consistently held that when rates and prac-
tices relating thereto were challenged under the antitrust laws, the
agencies had primary jurisdiction .... -270 In these circum-
stances, it is surprising that deference has not always been paid to the
primary jurisdiction of the CAB and that antitrust actions against
airlines have been entertained in the federal courts.280
Of course, an argument can be made to the effect that the public
should have a double protection against high rates and poor service
by applying to air carriers both the antitrust laws and the regulatory
legislation.28' And no doubt some peripheral matters beyond the
scope of regulation-such as purchases of fuel by an unsubsidized
carrier-should remain subject to antitrust sanctions. The price of
double protection, however, is contradiction and confusion. Inter-
ventionist commands will frequently conflict with Sherman Act
policy.2 2 Until each situation is examined, at considerable expense,
by the courts, no one will know which doctrine is paramount. We
have here, indeed, the makings of a truly chaotic situation. It follows
279Id. at 348. Compare Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S.
481, 496 (1958); Atlantic C.L.RtR. v. Riis & Co., 267 F.2d 657, 658-59 (D.C. Cir.
1958) ; Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. v. Air Coach Transp. Ass'n, 253 F.2d 877, 886 (D.C.
Cir. 1958); Pacific Northwest Pipeline Co., 31 P.U.R.3d 456, 460 (F.P.C. 1959);
DAvIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 19.06, .08 (1958); Mitchell, Primary .Ttris-
diction, 13 ABA ANTITRUST REP. 26, 29, 38 (1958).
280 Slick Airways v. American Airlines, 107 F. Supp. 199, 209 (D.NJ. 1952),
aff'd sub nom. American Airlines v. Forman, 204 F.2d 230, 233 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 806 (1953). Compare Atlantic C.L.R.R. v. Riis & Co., 267 F.2d 657 (D.C.
Cir. 1958). In some cases the CAB's lack of reparation power has been found an
adequate ground to sustain treble damage suits under the antitrust laws. S.S.W.,
Inc. v. Air Transp. Ass'n, 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1951); Hawaiian Airlines,
Ltd. v. Trans-Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 78 F. Supp. 1, 8 (D. Hawaii 1948). Compare
Fitzgerald v. Pan Am. World Airways, 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956) ; Carolina Motor
Serv. v. Atlantic C.L.RLR., 210 N.C. 36, 185 S.E. 479, 481 (1936).
281 At times the CAB has indicated that it thought a measure of competition
was desirable to supplement regulation. Colonial Airlines, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 552, 555
(1944); Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc., 4 C.A.B. 373, 374-75 (1943). Compare
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458 (1960);
FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1960); California League of
Ind. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959); Bennett
v. Southern Ry., 211 N.C. 474, 191 S.E. 240 (1937); Hector, supra note 242, at
104-07.
282 Apgar Travel Agency, Inc. v. International Air Transp. Ass'n, 107 F. Supp.
706, 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). Compare FTC v. Travelers Health Ass'n, 362 U.S. 293
(1960) ; FTC v. National Cas. Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564-65 (1958) ; FCC v. RCA, 346
U.S. 86, 92 (1953) ; United States v. Canfield DriveAway Co., 159 F. Supp. 448 (E.D.
Mich. 1958). A leading student of economics, Professor Fritz Machlup, has testified as
follows: "There is hardly a field in the American Economy that is worse with regard
to monopolistic restraints than transportation . . . . We have been regulating freight
rates since 1887 . . . . We have suppressed competition, we have prevented prices
from getting lower, and we are still doing it. We enacted later the Motor Carriers
Act . . . . [N]o industry . . . is worse than our transportation industry, so far
as monopolistic restrictions and suppression of competition are concerned." Hearings
Before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 10, at 4965 (1959).
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that airlines should be almost totally exempted from the sweep of anti-
trust legislation-or, in the alternative, that regulation should be lim-
ited to the protection of public safety. 83
283 Becker, Competition and Democracy, 1 J. LAw & EcoN. 105, 109 (1958);
Healy, Workable Competition in Air Transportation, 35 PROCEEDINGS Am. EcON.
Ass'N 229, 241 (1945).
